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Overview
This doctoral thesis contributes to some key issues analyzed in labor eco-
nomics. The research follows three dierent lines focusing, respectively, on
the labor market polarization, the relationship between immigration and
female labor market partecipation and, nally, the impact of intrinsic moti-
vation on task allocation. Depending on the specic subject, the analysis is
carried out from a theoretical and/or empirical point of view.
The rst part of the research belongs to the wide literature on wage
inequality and job market polarization.
During the 1980s some researchers started noticing a clear trend in in-
creasing inequality in US income distribution. Then, in the mid-to late
1980s, new data showed a sharp and continuing growth in inequality. Since
the beginning of 1990s many authors studied this phenomenon and impor-
tant papers by Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Levy
and Murname (1992) and Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) reach the same
important conclusions. First of all, inequality had been growing sharply in
the 1980s; secondly, the primary factor behind the growth was the increase
in the relative demand for skill. While these authors were not very inter-
ested in explainig the source of this phenomenon, later in 1990s, it became
widely accepted that the skill-biased technical change (SBTC), driven by
computers revolution, was the main source of growth in the relative demand
for skill, as claimed by Krueger(1993) and Bound, Berman and Griliches
(1994). Among researchers there was consensus also relatively to the fact
that all dimensions of inequality were growing in the 1980s, as return to
education and experience, residual and within group inequality (Juhn, Mur-
phy and Pierce, 1993). According to them the SBTC drove increase in all
dimension of skill (education, experience, unobservable ability,etc). Also
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Acemoglu (2002) claims that technological change was the leading explana-
tion for inequality growth in the US throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.
The main problem with the SBTC explanation was the evidence that many
advanced economies like France, Japan and Germany (hit by the same tech-
nological shock) failed to experience any signicant growth in inequality dur-
ing 1980s. Freeman and Katz (1995) suggest that the supply and demand
changes, related to SBTC, were part of the story and that the remaining
part is related to wage-setting institutions. They claim that the common
demand shock across countries are mitigated by supply and institutional
factors (i.e. union bargaining in France and Germany). Moreover, authors
like Card(1992), Freeman (1993), Di Nardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) and
Lee (1999) show that even in the United States wage setting institutions
- as the reduction of unionization and the decline in the real value of the
minimum wage - appear to play a role in inequality growth. All these factors
moved in the same direction, giving the impression that a single factor as
SBTC was the only drinving force behind the increase in wage inequality.
But this is not true; indeed the SBTC is not able to account for the diverg-
ing patterns of inequality growth across advanced countries and it failed to
provide explanation for the fact that institutional factors were also impor-
tant, especially in the lower end of the wage distribution.
Debate went on during the following years and some researchers like Min-
cer (1997) and Deschenes (2002) showed that the wage gap between post-
graduates and college graduated increased more than that between college
graduate and high school graduates that, in turn, increased more than wage
gap between high school graduates and high scholl dropouts. Piketty and
Saez (2003) nd that wage gains are concentrated in the very top of the
earnings distribution. Moreover, Lemieux (2006) shows that within-group
inequality grew substantially among college-educated workers but changed
a little for most other groups. Autor, Katz and Kearny (2005) provide ev-
idence that top end wage inequality (dierence between the 90th and the
50th percentiles of the distribution of residuals) increased, while residual in-
equality at the low end (the 50  10 gap) actually decreased. With respect
to this point Lemieux, MacLeod and Parent (2007) shows that all of the
growth in inequality prior to 1988-90 is concentrated in the 1980s. More-
over he shows that while both low end (50-10 gap) and top end (90-50 gap)
inequality were growing before 1988-90, the situation was very dierent in
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the 1990s and 2000s. The 50-10 gap declined while the 90-50 gap continued
to grow as in the previous period. So, after 1990 we observe a U-shape in
the change of real wages, as workers both in the lower and upper tails of the
distribution were characterized by larger gains than workers in the middle
of the distribution.
Many institutional factors have been taken into account to explain the pre-
vious evidence relative to the dierence between US and UK and the conti-
nental Europe and the U-shape pattern of wage inequality. DiNardo, Fortin
adn Lemieux (1996) and Lee (1999) suggest that most of the growth in the
50-10 gap in the 1980s was due to the decline in the minimum wage but they
underline that it cannot account for the growth in the top end inequality.
Fortin and Lemieux (1997) highlights a second institutional factor that can
be useful to explain the changes in top end inequality after 1990, that
is deregulation. Instead, Card (1992) and Freeman (1993) show that de-
unionization accounts for a sizeable share of the increase in the variance of
wages in the 1980s. Finally, Picketty and Saez (2003, 2006) provide evi-
dence that wages are less equally distributed on performance-pay than non
performance-pay jobs, because returns to education are higher in performance-
pay jobs. So, they suggest that the growth of performance pay in the 1980s
and 1990s could have contributed to the increase in wages variance; indeed,
they show that its contribution is about 25% of the overall increase.
As evident, there exists a wide body of literature that has shown the impor-
tance of wage setting institutions in explaining the US changes in inequality.
De-unionization explains increasing inequality at the top end and decreas-
ing inequality at the low end. Minimum wage can account for the fact that
inequality expanded in the low end of the distribution in the 1980s, when
the real value of the minimum wage fell sharply. Finally, higher use of per-
formance pay jobs justies a large share of the growth in inequality above
the 80th percentile of the wage distribution.
An additional element in favour of the institutional approach is suggested by
Freeman and Katz (1995). They claim that institutional factors are impor-
tant to explain cross-country dierences in inequality changes. We see, for
example, that countries where top-end inequality increased the most (US,
Uk and Canada) experienced a large decline in the importance of union.
Manacorda (2004) shows that the Italian inequality pattern is linked to the
rise and fall of the Scala Mobile, a country wide indexation system that com-
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pressed wages by awarding larger cost-of-living adjustments to low wage than
high wage workers. Relatively to German the paper of Dustman, Ludsteck
and Schonberg (2007) indicates that inequality increased while unionization
rate declined substantially over the last twenty years. They provide evi-
dence that de-unionization accounts for a large part of the German growth
in inequality.
Even though institutions have been shown to be important determinants of
wage and income inequality, they typically do not quantitatively account
for most of the observed changes in wage dispersion. Moreover, as claimed
by Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2001) it could emerge a problem of
endogeneity. If unions keep strong wage compression policies to face the
decreased demand of low skilled workers due to the SBTC, this will result
in de-unionization since the outside option of skilled workers will grow and,
consequently, the coalition between skilled and unskilled workers in support
of unions will be weakened. Given these limits, some authors started to
investigate other factors beyond institutions that may be a source of these
changes.
The SBTC rests on the idea that workers vary according to their skill level
and that the price of skill increased in response to a growing demand for
skill due to technological changes. Autor, Katz and Kearny (2006) pro-
pose a nuanced version of the SBTC to explain the U-shape of wage growth
appeared in the US after 1990. They claim - as well as Autor, Levy and
Murnane (2003) - that the simple denition of skilled and unskilled workers
is not enough to capture the eect of technological change. They introduce
an additional distinction between routine tasks, that can be also executed
by computers, and non-routine tasks that require human labor. In their
theoretical model they show that the large diusion of computers, due to
the decline of their price, displaces routine workers, who shift to manual
tasks jobs, decreasing the routine employment as well as routine wages.
Consequently, manual employment increases and, according to the relative
variation of manual demand and supply, the manual wage may increase or
decrease. Finally, non-routine abstract wage and employment rises, because
of the higher demand induced by the complementarity of abstract jobs with
the computer diusion.
Using data from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles they show that the
share of the workforce in routine occupations has declined over time, pro-
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viding evidence that the technological change is biased against these types
of jobs. Moreover, they show that changes in occupational shares are U-
shaped, that is occupation in the middle of the skill distribution declined
relative to occupations both at the bottom and top end. Therefore, the
Autor, Katz and Kearney theoretical explanation is consistent with the US
evidence (that is the same for UK, Goos and Manning, 2007).
Another possible explanations of the polarization phenomenon is that the
rise in the share of income going to the rich in the US and the UK may have
led to an increase in demand for low-skilled workers whose employment in-
creasingly consists of providing home services to the rich (Manning, 2004;
Mazzolari and Ragusa, 2007). Given that the technological change increased
the opportunity cost of time of high skill workers, they outsourced many
services that are substitutes of household production. Because these kind
of services are generally provided by low skill workers, an increase in high
skilled workers wage and employment is associated with an increase in low
skilled workers wage and employment. Also oshoring could have aected
the employment structure of developed countries in the same way(Blinder,
2007). In fact, Levy and Murname (2006) suggest that routine jobs that can
be replaced by computers are also the easiest ones to oshore. On the con-
trary, services perfomed by doctors, lawyers and professors cannot oshored
so easily.
The research presented in the rst chapter (carried out with Elisabetta
Olivieri) follows this literature. Its main goal is to explain cross-country
dierences in job polarization trends, focusing on a Continental European
country, i.e., Italy, where there has been signicant polarization in wages
from 1985 to 2004 but where the proportion of low-income workers has not
signicantly changed. In doing so, we study the interactions between the in-
stitutional environment and technical innovations in order to verify whether
national peculiarities can still lead to dierent inequality trends in a global
economy. Indeed, the result of the nuanced version of the SBTC is based
on the hypothesis of competitive labor market, that does not t well with
Italy (and other European countries), characterized by strong labor market
institutions. To cope with this problem we develop a model that follows the
one proposed by Autor et al. (2006) and where we introduce labor market
institution. In their nuanced version of the skill-biased technological change
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- where the computerization is embodied by an exogenous shock, i.e., the
decline in the real price of computers - we introduce some rigidities related
to the bargaining process. In our model, the union bargains with the rm
for the highest possible wage compatible with a certain employment objec-
tive. The size of this employment target is crucial to determine the eects
of computerization on the labor market. Therefore we enrich the nuanced
version of the SBTC with the presence of a labor market institution in order
to explain the dierences between Italy (and other European countries) and
US in wage and employment growth patterns.
The second line of this research focuses on the the impact that immigra-
tion has on the female partecipation in the labor market.
A signicant body of literature regards the immigrant' eects on the
labour market of destination countries. Dierent results have been provided
and economists continue to debate the wage eects of immigrants inow.
The main goal of the analysis is the understanding of the eects induced on
the groups of natives competing directly with immigrants (Altonji and Card,
1991, Borjas et al. 1996, Card and Di Nardo 2000, Card 2001, ), especially
when we consider low skilled migrants. Some authors (Borjas, 1992, and
Borjas, Frreman and Katz, 1996) argue that large inow of immigrants re-
duced the wage paid to natives with similar characteristics. When workers'
skills are dierentiated only by their level of educational attainement, then
a large ow of immigrants with low level of education reduced wages paid
to less educated natives through direct substituitability in carrying out the
same typologies of jobs. Ottaviano and Peri (2008) develop their analysis
following a dierent assumption, that immigrants and natives with simi-
lar observable characteristics are imperfect substitutes in production and,
therefore, they don't compete with most native-born workers. This is due
by the fact that natives and foreign-born workers of comparable educational
attainement and age might posses unique skills that lead them to specialize
in dierent occupation. The immediate consequence is a lower wage loose
that hits natives workers. In particular, Peri and Sparber (2009) show em-
pirically that natives and foreign born workers within the same groups of
workers specialize in dierentiated production tasks. Less educated foreign-
born workers are found mostly in agricultural and personal services while
natives in manufacturing and mining.
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The latter evidence is interestingly correlated with the work of Cortes and
Tessada (2007), resting on the fact that low skilled immigrants work dis-
proportionately in service sectors that are closely substitutes of household
production. Starting from that they claim that low-skilled immigration
could aect the time-use decisions of natives, in particular those taken by
high skilled women. Indeed, the prices reduction of time intensive services,
induced by low skilled immigrants who increase labor supply, has risen hours
worked by women with a graduate degree, especially those with a profes-
sional degree or PhD and those with children. In addition, they nd a
decrease in the time high skilled women spend in household work and in-
creases reported expenditures on housekeeping services.
The work of Cortes and Tessada (2007) is interesting especially because
moves away from the tradional focus and tries to explore a new dimension
in which low skilled immigrants aect the average level of natives welfare
and its distribution.
Other papers deal with the eects of immigration on prices for services.
Cortes (2008) estimates the impact of low-skilled immigration on prices,
wages and purchasing power of US natives and nds that, at city level,
low-skilled immigration benets the native population by decreasing the
nontraded goods component of the cost of living (such as housekeeping and
gardening). In particular, the group of natives that benets the most is that
of high-skilled natives, because they devote a larger share of their budget to
immigrant-intensive services. She suggests that wages are a likely channel
through which this eect takes place. Indeed, Cortes (2008) nds that a
10-percent increase in the share of low-skilled immigrants in the labor force
decreases the price of immigrant-intensive services by 2 percent. Interest-
ingly, she nds that the local concentration of low-skilled immigrants has
little impact on the prices of traded goods.
The research presented in the second chapter (carried out with Elisabetta
Olivieri), investigating the eects of immigration on wages (here considered
as a good proxy of prices) in the non-tadable services sector and trying to
explore the conseguences of immigration for female partecipation to the la-
bor market, is part of this literature. Looking at the channel through which
immigrant inows can aect female natives situation, it provides additional
evidence, using Italian data, of the positive outcome that natives can get
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from the presence of immigrants.
Italy is one of the developed countries with the lowest female partecipation
in the labor market and where women spend more time on home produc-
tion. Hence, the research considers the Italian labor market for services
directly substitute for household production in order to verify whether it
could be responsible in some way for the labor supply decisions of Italian
women. This kind of analysis calls into question also the immigration issue,
since immigrants are highly specialized in time-intensive low-skilled services.
A higher supply of labor in these market sectors could in principle have a
positive eect on the native labor supply - through the reduction of wages
paid to home services workers. The goal of the empirical analysis, devel-
oped using an instrumental variable approach, is twofold. First, it studies
the wage and employment patterns of the market for non-tradable home
services. Secondly, it deals with the possible impact that migrants inows
have on female labor decisions.
The third chapter investigates what the introduction of intrinsic moti-
vation implies for the denition of the optimal incentive scheme when the
worker carries out more than one task. Therefore, such analysis, is a trait
d'union between the multitasking principal agent theory and the literature
on intrinsic motivation.
Contributions of the last decades in principal-agent theory have recog-
nized the need of a broad perspective, focusing on the denition of the
optimal incentive scheme when agents carry out more than one task. The
eort allocation among dierent tasks is determined by the relative benets
the agents derive from the various tasks and from their complementarity or
substitutability in terms of cost of eort. In this framework, the incentives
provided by the principal don't serve only to allocate the risks, motivate
and reward hard work, but also to direct the allocation of agent's attention
among various tasks. Therefore, the interaction between tasks becomes re-
ally crucial.
The most important contribution is the paper of Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1991) that oers the most general treatment of the multitasking issue in a
moral hazard context, where the crowding out or crowding in eects emerge,
depending on the fact that tasks are substitute or complement in the agent's
cost function. In this framework, given the interaction between tasks, incen-
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tives for any given activity can be provided either by rewarding that activity
or by decreasing its opportunity cost, through the reduction of the incentive
for the other activity.
There are many application of this mechanism. The denition of the incen-
tive pay for teachers (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991); the quality-quantity
trade-o (Laont and Tirole, 1991; Hart et al., 1997); the balance between
short and long term prot incentives (Laont and Tirole, 1988; Holmstrom
and Milgrom, 1991).
The interaction between dierent activities could also imply the task separa-
tion, such that each tasks is assigned to a dierent agent. This occurs in the
paper of Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), where they consider the eort spent
looking for pros and cons of a given decision (in the judicial area). Other
examples concern the ex ante and ex post control of fraud or misbehaviour
(Boot et al, 1993; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994a) or the demand-side man-
agement in energy regulation (Joskow, 1990).
Splitting tasks between several agents is not always useful; sometimes the
multitasking framework predicts task clustering. This happens when tasks
have similar degrees of measurability, when there is the risk of conicts of
interest or when the objective is the functional specialization, i.e. the uni-
cation of tasks requiring similar talents. The basic mechanism acting in the
multitasking framework is the crowding out, that is the result of the tasks
interaction.
Also Frey (1997), analyzing the relationship between intrinsic motivation
and extrinsic rewards, introduces a crowding out eect that he calls moral
crowding out eect. He points out that, since intrinsic motivation refers
to doing something because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable, and
so rewarding, an external intervention - be it rewards or commands - may
aect intrinsic motivation. The external intervention crowds-out intrinsic
motivation when it is felt to be controlling but crowds-in intrinsic motivation
when it is perceived to be supporting self-determination and self-esteem.
When moral crowding out occurs, work performance decreases if the negative
eect on intrinsicn motivation induced by an extrinsic reward dominates the
normally considered positive eect of external interventions. Frey (1997,
1999, 2001) empirically shows the relevance of this eect, underlying how it
allows to explain some evidences contradicting principal-agent theory, such
as why pay-for-performance is so little used, why managers of for-prot
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institutions receive part of their salary in terms of bonuses while managers
in non-for prot institutions receive a xed payment or why people are more
willing to accept a locally unwanted project, but useful for the comunity, if
they are not paid to accept that.
The vast work of Frey, as well as theoretical and empirical evidence from
psycholosy and sociology, clearly highlights the importance of the agent's
intrinsic motivation in terms of agent's behaviour and incentives provision.
Indeed, the view of human motivation based only on extrinsic interven-
tions (i.e. rewards, punishment, control) appears to be narrow and may
severely limit the understanding of the determinants and eects of incen-
tives. For this reason many authors have tried to better understand the
levels and the changes in agents' behaviour introducing intrinsic motivation
in the principal-agent framework and studying its implication with respect
to dierent situations.
Heyes (2005) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) focus on the screening of work-
ers' motivation in order to attract highly motivated workers. The higher
productivity of those workers is assumed by Heyes while Delfgaauw and
Dur prove it extending a standard incentive wage model. Then both paper
examine how the principal can attract and select highly motivated workers to
ll a vacancy. Even if in a dierent framework they get that posting a higher
wage decreases the expected average quality of job applicants because less
(or not) motivated workers are induced to apply. This result derives from
the fact that motivated workers obtain utility directly from working.
The previous result is got also by Nyborg, Kverndokk and Brekke (2003),
who focus mainly on the motivation related to the way in which job impacts
on the workers' self-image. They study the self-selection into dierent occu-
pations, considering that agents dier in their preference for being important
to others. What emerges is that those with intermediate preferences will end
up in private market employment, while the public sector (where eort and
productivity cannot be veried) will attract both workers with highest and
lowest work motivation. The rst ones for the opportunity to be impor-
tant, the second ones for the opportunity to shirk. Given this result they
suggest that a solution to attract motivated workers to the public sector,
without attracting shirkers, is not a wage increase but the improvement of
the workers' opportunities to do a good job, by investing capital that rises
their productivity. Also in this case it is evident that the presence of intrin-
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sic motivation is able to modify the way in which workers behave and the
incentive scheme that has to be dened.
The work of Nyborg, Kverndokk and Brekke (2003) is a link between theoret-
ical analyses that underline the less importance of monetary rewards when
motivated workers are considered and those analyses looking in particular
at the implication of workers' motivation for the job design. Francois (2000)
and Besley and Ghatak (2005) study incentives in this context, focusing
on the role of matching the mission preferences of the principal and agents
in increasing organizational eciency. When workers' motivation is related
to some particular mission, as the public service motivation presented by
Francois (2000), an organization having as main goal the attainment of that
mission rather than the prot (as government bureaucracy) obtains more
eort from agents. On the other hand, a mission-oriented organization that
hires workers sharing the same mission can economize on the need for high-
powered incentives, because the agents' eort is also remunerated by the
simple fact of working in that particular context. So, it clearly emerges,
that the presence of workers' intrinsic motivation makes some aspects of
the organization design (i.e. mission choice, relational dynamics,etc) impor-
tant because they directly act on the intrinsic incentives leading the agents'
working behaviour.
My rearch is part of this literature that looks carefully at the presence
of intrinsic motivation in the principal-agent relationship and enriches it by
studying the implication of the agent's motivation in a multitasking frame-
work.
I develop a theoretical model, based on the multitasking framework proposed
by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), where an agent carries out two tasks:
one that is directly related to the intrinsic motivation for the job and an-
other one that is not. Moreover, they may dier according to their degrees
of observability. This heterogeneity derives from the evidence according
to which the eort for tasks that embody intrinsic motivation (caring for
nurses, teaching of high-thinking skills for teachers, etc.) is generally less
measurable than the eort ralated to non motivational tasks (i.e. burau-
cratic activities, teaching basic skills, etc.). The main mechanism acting in
this framework, the indirect moral crowding out eect, captures the link be-
tween the multitasking principal agent theory and the literature on intrinsic
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motivation. It implies that, when the agent is highly intrinsically motivated,
the principal has to set a xed wage and, therefore, is no more able to use
monetary rewards as an incentive device. Given this result, the empirical
analysis carried out in the second part of the chapter, using the National
Sample Survey of US registered nurses, aims at verifying the validity of a
dierent source of incentives emerging from the theoretical analysis - the
tasks allocation.
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Chapter 1
Job Polarization and Labor
Market Institutions
1.1 Introduction
In the last decades, labor markets of developed countries such as the US
and the UK have undergone a deep restructuring in response to a powerful
force of change, the computerization process. As a result, since the late
1980s, the related wage structures have been experiencing some crucial rad-
ical changes: (i) the proportion of middle-income jobs, which represented
the core of employment during post-war years, has declined, (ii) wages have
grown faster in the top and bottom of the earning distribution than in the
middle. We generally call these phenomena employment and wage polariza-
tion. 1
Goos et al. (2009) show that job polarization is a pervasive phenomenon
not conned to the US economy. They also nd in Europe a huge fall in the
fraction of middle-income jobs (on average -7.77% from 1992 to 2006). This
is a surprising result, given that during the last decades, labor market in-
stitutions in continental Europe were able to mitigate the eects of market
forces through the collective bargaining process (Krugman, 1994; OECD,
1994; Blau and Kahn, 1996). Despite their ndings, there is a certain cross-
country heterogeneity among the polarization patterns. In particular, unlike
in the US, in Continental Europe, the fall in the employment share of middle-
1See Autor et al. (2003), Goos and Manning (2007), Autor et al. (2006), Lemieux
(2007).
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paid jobs does not come with a growth in the fraction of low-paid jobs.
This analysis aims at explaining cross-country dierences in job polar-
ization trends, focusing on a Continental European country, i.e., Italy, where
there has been signicant polarization in wages from 1985 to 2004 but where
the proportion of low-income workers has not signicantly changed. In do-
ing so, we study the interactions between the institutional environment and
technical innovations in order to verify whether national peculiarities can
still lead to dierent inequality trends in a global economy.
We develop a model that analyzes the impact of computerization on
wages and employment in dierent parts of the wage distribution. We
imagine an economy with three types of human labor inputs in produc-
tion: high-skilled workers performing non-routine cognitive tasks, moder-
ately skilled workers performing routine tasks, and low-skilled workers hired
in non-routine manual tasks. Our point of reference is the framework of
Autor et al. (2006), who propose a nuanced version of the skill-biased tech-
nological change for the US case. In their framework, computerization is
embodied by an exogenous shock, i.e., the decline in the real price of com-
puters. If computers directly substitute for routine tasks and most strongly
complement cognitive and manual tasks, then an exogenous reduction in the
real price of computing power will lead to some polarizing trends in wage
and employment growth, consistent with the ndings observed in the US.
The main dierence between our model and theirs is the labor market
environment; while they analyze the eects of computerization in a com-
petitive framework, we introduce some rigidities related to the bargaining
process. In our model, the union bargains with the rm for the highest pos-
sible wage compatible with a certain employment objective. The size of this
employment target is crucial to determine the eects of computerization on
the labor market.
Our model predicts that technological change induces (i) a reduction of
wages and employment in routine labor tasks, typically replaced by com-
puter capital; (ii) an increase in wages and employment in abstract labor
tasks that are complements to computers; (iii) some heterogeneous results
in the manual labor market, depending on the union employment target.
We expect a positive eect on manual wages and no change in manual em-
ployment when the union protects only its current members (insiders); we
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have an uncertain eect on manual wages and a positive one on manual
employment when unions care about the entire manual labor supply.
According to this model, Italian labor market institutions have avoided
employment growth in low-paid jobs by maintaining a high level of man-
ual wage. Since other unionized labor markets have behaved in a similar
way (France, Germany, Spain), this model can be useful in order to explain
cross-country dierences in job polarization trends.
The paper is organized as follows: after a brief survey of the related lit-
erature, we summarize the Italian institutional and technological setting in
section 3. In section 4, we show our empirical evidence, and we then describe
our theoretical model in section 5. Finally, we discuss our results in section 6.
1.2 The Changing Nature of Wage Inequality
Debate on the eects of the computerization process on wage inequality
started intensifying in the US during the 1980s, when after more than 50
years of a narrowing or fairly stable wage structure, a number of researchers
noticed a denite increasing trend in wage inequality. There was wide con-
sensus over the fact that the technological change driven by the computer
revolution was not factor-neutral: it favored skilled over unskilled labor by
increasing the relative productivity of skilled workers and, therefore, their
relative demand. 2 Even if the so-called skill-biased technological change
(SBTC) is the most convincing explanation, a number of facts are even
today dicult to reconcile with this framework. The hypothesis of SBTC
comes under attack whenever we try to compare the US evidence with ob-
servations from other advanced countries, such as Italy, France, Japan or
Germany. These had witnessed much smaller increases in inequality during
the 1980s or no increases at all, yet rms in those economies had access to
the same technologies as did rms in the US or Britain.
In the attempt to solve this puzzle, many authors have considered cross-
country heterogeneity in labor market institutions. 3 According to this
view, English-speaking countries had reected every change occurred in the
2For a review see Levy and Murnane (1992), Katz and Autor (1999).
3For instance, Blau and Kahn (1996). For details on the impact of institutions on the
US labor market see Fortin and Lemieux (1997).
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demand and supply for skill, while European wage structures had been pro-
tected from every shock by their collective bargaining processes.
This debate did not conclude in the 1990s: it is still evolving with recent
stylized facts. Above all, the decline in the proportion of middle-income
jobs in the US is the main piece of evidence to be explained. Moreover,
US employment polarization has been accompanied by wage polarization:
wages have been growing faster in the top and bottom quartiles than in the
middle two quartiles, with a continued spreading out of the distribution in
the top quartile. In other words, the lower part of the wage distribution has
no more lost out relative to the middle. For some, middle-class decline has
been an unremarkable feature of economic adjustments and does not at all
represent a policy problem. A widening employment polarization, however,
means a growing number of working poor. Thus, it may accelerate the ero-
sion of the middle-class majority that stabilizes political life and plant the
seeds of new political tensions in years to come. 4
There are dierent possible explanations of the polarization phenomenon.
The rise in the share of income going to the rich in the US and the UK may
have led to an increase in demand for low-skilled workers whose employment
increasingly consists of providing home services to the rich (Manning, 2004;
Mazzolari and Ragusa, 2007). Also, outsourcing could have aected the
employment structure of developed countries (Blinder, 2007). Finally, the
third possible factor is the computerization process. With this concern in
mind, Autor et al. (2006) propose a more nuanced version of SBTC where
technology can aect in dierent ways dierent parts of the wage distribu-
tion. They suggest that the eect of technological progress is to replace
routine labor, which tends to be in the middle of the wage distribution.
The last explanation is probably the most convincing 5. However, their
model may fail to t Continental Europe because of its very restrictive as-
sumptions. Above all, the hypothesis of a perfect competitive labor market
does not account for the collective bargaining process. Our goal is to give
a theoretical contribution by examining the peculiarities of Continental Eu-
rope, wich is characterized by strong labor market institutions.
4For details on policy responses to employment polarization see Banting, Beach and
Betcherman (1995).
5See Goos et al. (2009).
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The bargaining process can be modeled in many dierent ways. In our
framework, we assume that a union and a rm bargain over the level of
wages. The union's goal is to reach the highest possible wage compatible
with a certain employment level (Blanchard and Summers, 1986). The size
of this employment target is crucial in order to catch the eects of a tech-
nological shock on the wage and employment structures.
1.3 The Italian Setting
The US economy experienced in the 1990s a period of massive invest-
ment in information and communication technology (ICT), fueled by strong
computer price declines. Analogous information on the European coun-
tries is quite limited, due to the lack of reliable measures of ICT capital
stock. According to the World Bank, from 1991 to 2004, the number of
PCs in Italy grew by 588% (499% in Germany, 561% in France, 381% in the
United Kingdom). The percentage of rms that fulll Internet orders grew
by more than 40 percentage points from 2003 to 2007 (ISTAT). Bugamelli
and Pagano (2004), using microdata on Italian manufacturing rms, suggest
a measure of capital stock that includes hardware, software and communi-
cation equipment. They show a delay in ICT accumulation with respect to
US manufacturing of about 8 years and nd a positive correlation at the
rm level between ICT investment and reorganization. Despite the delay
and the dierent magnitude of the computerization process in Italy and in
English-speaking countries, technological change has also been aecting the
Italian economy. Thus, we could say that currently, the computerization
pressure on the Italian wage and employment structure is the same that has
occurred in the US since the 1980s.
In order to analyze the consequences of these pressures on the Ital-
ian labor market, we have to focus on the Italian institutional setting. 6
The wages of Italian workers are determined through a national agreement.
Three major confederations of sectoral unions (CGIL, CISL and UIL), char-
acterized by dierent political inspirations, represent Italian workers. On
6For details on the Italian labor market see Brandolini et al. (2001), Erickson and
Ichino (1995), Brandolini et al. (2006).
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the other side, all private industrial employers are represented by a single
association (Conndustria) that has traditionally played the leading role
in bargaining. Other similar associations represent employers in the other
main sectors. This agreement sets minimum contractual wages for employ-
ees at dierent skill levels in each industry, covering both unionized and
non-unionized workers. Higher wages can be negotiated at the rm level
for a single worker or a group of workers. Typically, sectoral contracts last
approximately three years.
Until the early 1990s, all wage levels were also automatically adjusted by
the Scala Mobile indexation mechanism, which granted the same absolute
wage increase to all employees as prices rose, thereby potentially compress-
ing wage dierentials. The formal abolition of this mechanism took place in
1993, even if its equalizing eects had been falling since the late 1980s. After
that, national wage increases were anchored to a new forward-looking policy
tool, the target ination rate, avoiding that social conict were ultimately
resolved by ination.
Collective agreements set wages by dierentiating according to a skill
ranking system. The law divides employers into four categories: blue-
collars, white-collars, quadri, 7 and managers. The nature of the occupation,
whether manual or intellectual, traces the border between blue-collar work-
ers and the other categories, while the amount of directive responsibility
traces the distinctions among the highest categories.
In the last decades, some deep changes have crucially contributed to
make the Italian labor market more competitive than before. Unions pro-
gressively began to lose members and public support. Another key factor
has been increasing competition by emerging economies in manufacturing
sector. Competition has obliged rms to rapidly reorganize their structures,
sometimes externalizing inecient or expensive phases of the production
process. A further source of change has been the huge diusion of tempo-
rary jobs. In 1997, the so-called Treu Law (Law 196/1997): (i) legalized
temporary contracts; (ii) reformed some non-standard labor relationships
(apprenticeship); (iii) and legalized and regulated the supply of temporary
workers by authorized agencies. 8 This reform represents one of the steps
7White-collar workers with directive responsibilities.
8The so called Temporary Help Employment, a contract in which an agency hires a
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towards the liberalization of atypical contracts, which are less expensive for
rms in terms of taxes and social security payments.
1.4 The Italian Trends of Polarization
Our main source of data is the WHIP. 9 It is a database of individual
work histories, based on Italian social security institute (INPS) archives.
The reference population is made up by all the people, Italian and foreign,
who have worked in Italy even for only a part of their working career. A
large representative sample has been extracted from this population: the
sampling coecient is about 1:180 for a dynamic population of 370,000 peo-
ple. These data are collected through 20 surveys carried out yearly over
the period 1985-2004. The dataset provides information on employees with
working experience in Italian private sector. On average, we have 65,000
labor relationships per year. Around 67% of employee labor relationships
concern blue-collars, 32% white-collars, and 1% managers.
The above dataset allowed us to obtain information about: (i) the profes-
sional status of employees: place of work, type of contract, business sector,
employment qualication and number of worked weeks per year; (ii) the
employees' annual earnings. In this analysis, we use real weekly wages ex-
pressed in Euros: their values are obtained by dividing the annual earnings
by the number of weeks worked. These nominal values are then transformed
into real terms using a price deator.
Once collected, these data are used to observe the changing nature of
inequality in dierent parts of the wage distribution over the period of anal-
ysis. Figure 1 plots the annual average growth of weekly real earnings by
wage percentile 10 from 1985 to 2004. On the whole, in the last decades
very low wages and very high wages have been the ones that have grown
the most. This evidence is very striking. In particular, Autor et al. (2006)
have calculated a dierence in cumulative wage growth between the lower
extreme and the middle of the US wage distribution of 5 log points from
worker with the aim of placing him in a using rm for a short-term assignment.
9The Work Histories Italian Panel, created by the centre for employment studies Lab-
oratorio R. Revelli. See http://www.laboratoriorevelli.it/whip.
10From the 4th to the 96th percentile.
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1988 to 2004, while our gap in cumulative wage growth over the same years
is about 15 log points.
Figure 1.1: Changes in log weekly wages by percentile. Source: WHIP, 1985-2004.
This wage growth curve can be dierently evaluated depending on the
related employment trends. Figure 2 shows how the share of worked weeks
in each occupation varies on average over time, after sorting occupations by
the average weekly wage paid in 1985. 11 This gure reveals that Italian
employment trends are dierent from American ones. Employment shares
especially remain rather constant along the whole 1985 wage distribution,
except for the most paid occupations. On the whole, we do not observe any
polarizing trend (u-shape curve) in employment shares; the proportion of
middle-income jobs has been declining a bit, but the share of low-paid jobs
has not been increasing.
1.5 The Theoretical Model
We propose a theoretical model that analyzes the impact of computer-
ization on wages and employment in a labor market characterized by the
presence of a bargaining process. Following the simple framework of Autor
11Our occupations come from the interaction between worker qualication (blue-collars,
clerks, executives) and industry (agriculture, manufacturing, electricity and gas, construc-
tion, trade, hotels and restaurants, transport and communication, nancial intermediation,
other services).
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Figure 1.2: Changes in employment shares by occupation. Occupations are sorted by
the average weekly wage paid in 1985. Source: WHIP, 1985-2004.
et al. (2006), computerization is embodied by an exogenous decline in the
real price of computers. Indeed, the decrease of computing power price has
been the main responsible factor of computer diusion in productive pro-
cesses.
We study an economy with three dierent groups of workplace tasks: ab-
stract (A), routine (R) and manual (M). These groups roughly correspond
to high-, intermediate- and low-skilled jobs. The technological shock hits in
a dierent way the workers hired in these three activities (Levy and Mur-
name, 2004). In particular, we assume that: (i) computer capital is a close
substitute for human labor in routine cognitive and manual activities; (ii)
routine tasks are complements of abstract tasks (e.g., coordination activities
and problem solving) and probably, to some extent, also of manual activi-
ties.
Aggregate output is produced using the Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion:
Y = LA(LR +K)
L

M (1.1)
where ; ;  2 (0; 1) and ++ = 1. Only workers can perform abstract
and manual tasks (LA, LM ), while routine tasks can be done either by work-
ers (LR) or by computer capital (K). K is measured in eciency units and
is elastically supplied to routine tasks at price  per eciency unit.
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The main dierence between our model and that used by Autor et al.
(2006) is the labor market environment. While they deal with a competi-
tive market, we introduce some rigidities related to the bargaining process
between unions and rms. We assume that the abstract labor market is
perfectly competitive, while in manual and routine labor markets, employ-
ment and wages depend on the bargaining process. The union's goal is to
reach in every labor market the highest possible wage compatible with a
certain employment target. 12 This target (Lj with j =M;R) is a function
of the number of union members, LIj , (employed workers at the moment of
the bargaining process) and of the total labor supply for those tasks, Sj .
Actually, the direct substitutability between routine workers and computer
capital leads the union to bargain a wage equal to the price of one eciency
unit of computer capital; otherwise, no routine worker would be employed.
Thus, despite the bargaining process, the nal outcome in the routine labor
market is equal to the competitive equilibrium.
The employment target in the manual labor market is:
LM = ﬃL
I
M + (1  ﬃ)SM ; (1.2)
where ﬃ 2 (0; 1) represents the weight assigned to LIM . If ﬃ is equal to
one, then LM = L
I
M . If ﬃ < 1, the employment target depends also on SM .
The union bargains over the wage level that equalizes LM to its expectation
on the demand of the rm E(LM ).
In this economy, there are many income-maximizing workers. Each of
them is endowed with a vector of three skills, one for each production task
(Ei = (ai; ri;mi)). College-graduate workers are endowed with one e-
ciency unit of abstract skill (Ei = (1; 0; 0)) that is inelastically supplied to
abstract tasks. Every non-graduate worker has one eciency unit to supply
to manual tasks and cannot perform abstract tasks. Moreover, non-graduate
workers are characterized by  eciency units of routine skill, with  being
a continuous variable distributed on the unit interval ( 2 (0; 1)) with pos-
itive probability mass at all points. Therefore, non-graduate workers have
the endowment vector Ei = (0; ; 1) and can choose to supply their eciency
units to either manual or routine tasks.
12It is reasonable to treat separately the three labor markets since the bargaining process
sets labor conditions for every industrial sector and worker qualication.
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Supply choices of the non-graduate workers are determined by a self-
selection rule. According to it, workers select themselves into one specic
task given their ability, the wage levels and the probability of being hired
for each task. Let wR and wM be the wage paid to routine and manual
tasks per eciency unit; then, each worker will compare wM and wR. The
higher the value of  is, the more likely it is that the worker chooses a rou-
tine job. Furthermore, supply choices depend on the probability of having a
job in the two sectors. Since the routine market equilibrium is equal to the
competitive outcome, at the equilibrium, no worker will be an involuntarily
unemployed. In the manual market, the probability of being employed de-
pends on ﬃ. Only when ﬃ = 0 there is certainly no unemployment. A more
restrictive employment target (ﬃ > 0) implies a lower probability of nding
a job in the manual sector and therefore a lower manual labor supply.
To summarize, manual labor supply (SM ) is a function of
wM
wR
and ﬃ,
with @SM
@
wM
wR
> 0, @SM
@ﬃ
< 0 and @
2SM
@
wM
wR
@ﬃ
< 0. The last derivative implies that
workers are more sensitive to changes in the relative wages when ﬃ is low.
Routine labor supply is SR(
wM
wR
;ﬃ), and an increase in relative wages
induces a deeper reduction in SR when ﬃ is low.
The wage denitions for abstract, routine and manual workers are dif-
ferent, depending on the functioning of the corresponding market. While
abstract and routine workers are paid at their marginal productivity, the
manual wage depends on the interaction between union and representative
rm. Once the bargaining process has led to the optimal wage, the level
of the manual employment LM is chosen by the rm according to its labor
demand function.
LM = (
LA(LR +K)

wM
)
1
1  : (1.3)
When no shock hits the economy, LM = E(LM ) = LM , and we obtain
wM from equations (2) and (3). Our result diers according to the value of
ﬃ. In particular, if union cares only about its current members (ﬃ = 1), we
have:
wM = L

A(LR +K)
LIM
 1: (1.4)
When ﬃ < 1:
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wM = L

A(LR +K)
[ﬃLIM + (1  ﬃ)SM ]
 1: (1.5)
Now we consider the eects of a positive shock on the manual labor
market. In particular, the exogenous force that hits the economy is the
reduction of the computer price, .
Since computer capital is a perfect substitute for routine labor input,
wR = , and, consequently, a decline in  reduces wR on a one-to-one basis.
With downward-sloping factor demand curves (R0() < 0), the decline in 
raises the demand for routine tasks. This increase in the demand for routine
tasks leads to an increase in the abstract and manual labor demands because
of the existing complementarities. Both computer capital and routine labor
inputs are potentially able to satisfy this additional routine demand, but
the self-selection rule implies that it will be satised by computer capital
(Autor et al., 2006). In fact, when  declines, the ratio between manual
and routine wages increases and some workers will decide to switch from
routine to manual tasks. These workers are those having the lowest values
of . Since the shock reduces SR, the employment in routine tasks declines.
A worker's decision to supply labor is related to the ease of nding a job
in each sector; thus, the magnitude of the labor supply change will depend
on the value of the parameter ﬃ. Noteworthy is that the less restrictive the
employment target is (the lower ﬃ is), the greater the reduction in SR will
be.
The eect of the reduction in  on manual employment depends on the
union policy and on the predictability of the shock. If the union does not
expect the increase in the manual demand, then LM = E(LM ) < LM , and
whatever the value of ﬃ, the manual employment increases. Actually, it is
reasonable to assume that the union can anticipate technological shocks. 13
Then, the bargained wage embodies the shock, and the employment level
coincides with the union expectation. In this case, the eects on the manual
labor market crucially depend on ﬃ. When ﬃ = 1, an increase in the manual
13This assumption is reasonable for all those economies a bit far from the technological
frontier (as Italy). Indeed, these economies generally face a given shock some years later
then the US, so they expect the technological innovations and their consequences on the
labor market.
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supply does not aect the union employment target; when ﬃ < 1, an increase
in SM leads to a positive eect on manual employment.
14 Therefore, the
higher ﬃ is, the lower the eect of the computer price decline on manual
employment. In particular, when ﬃ = 1, the increasing labor supply does
not play any role.
In order to analyze the eects of a decline in computer price on wages,
we dierentiate the three wage equations with respect to  . As far as the
routine wage is concerned, our result is obvious and strictly related to the
substitutability between computers and routine workers:
 
@wR
@
=  1: (1.6)
The impact of computerization on wM has to be studied separately when
ﬃ = 1 and ﬃ < 1. By dierentiating equation (4), we get:
 
@wM
@
=  LAR
 1@R
@
L
 1
M : (1.7)
This derivative is positive; therefore, the union is able to obtain a higher
wage level after the technological shock. Since manual employment does not
change, a higher demand for manual tasks - due to factor complementarities
- leads only to a higher wage level.
When ﬃ < 1, we dierentiate (5), getting:
 
@wM
@
= (1  )(1  ﬃ)LAR
[ﬃLIM + (1  ﬃ)SM ]
 2@SM
@
+
  LAR
 1@R
@
[ﬃLIM + (1  ﬃ)SM ]
 1: (1.8)
The eect of computerization on wM is no clear: two opposite eects
act simultaneously. On one side, complementarities would induce a manual
wage increase. On the other side, the workers' shift induces an increase in
SM due to the self-selection rule. Therefore, it tends to decrease manual
wage. The nal eect depends on the prevailing force. Both the eects
depend on ﬃ. A restrictive employment target implies that changes in labor
demand are almost completely transferred to wages; then the higher ﬃ, the
14
 
@L
M
@
=  (1  ﬃ) @SM
@
> 0.
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stronger the impact of factor complementarities. On the other side, the
impact of ﬃ on the supply-side eect is ambiguous: (i) when ﬃ is high,
fewer workers shift to manual tasks, (ii) the higher ﬃ is, the weaker the
increase in manual employment and (iii) the higher ﬃ is, the more demand-
side shocks are transferred to wages. While according to (i) and (ii) a
restrictive employment target implies a lower supply-side eect, (iii) makes
the supply-side eect stronger when ﬃ is high.
An interesting consideration arises from this result: the reduction of 
has a dierent impact on the manual labor market according to the weight
that labor market institutions assign to manual labor supply. Therefore, the
presence of union can aect the way computerization acts.
Finally, the abstract wage unambiguously increases:
 
@wA
@
=  L 1A [R
 1@R
@
L

M + R
L
 1
M
@LM
@
] > 0: (1.9)
This is due to the increase in the demand for abstract tasks, which is not
followed by a countervailing labor supply. Therefore, the computerization
process implies a higher wA and a higher abstract employment, exactly as
in Autor et al. (2006)'s model.
To summarize, the model predicts that a reduction in (= wR) induces
an increase in the demand for routine input - supplied by K - and a reduc-
tion in the labor supply to routine activities. Since less competition in the
labor market leads to less worker mobility, the dimension of this reduction
depends on ﬃ. Moreover, it has positive eect both on abstract wage and
abstract employment. The changes in wM and manual employment depend
on the union policy. When the union cares only about employed workers,
computerization leads to an increase in wM , and the wage structure tends
to polarize to the detriment of manual employment growth. 15 When the
union's behavior is more market oriented, an increase in the manual labor
supply has a positive eect on manual employment. Only in this case can
we observe an employment polarization as in Autor et al.'s (2006) perfect
competitive framework.
15Note that the observed wage, in the case of routine tasks, may dier from the wage
paid per eciency unit of routine task input. Observed routine wages are aected by
composition. As workers self-select out of routine tasks, the remaining routine workers
have above-average routine skills, meaning that the observed routine wage can either rise
or fall as  declines.
Chapter 1 15
In this setting, low-skilled unemployment seems to be the only alterna-
tive to employment polarization. Thus, the union, by bargaining for a high
level of low-skilled wage, decreases inequality in the lower tail of the earn-
ing distribution, at the cost of an increasing number of unemployed workers.
1.6 A Discussion of the Italian Trends
Autor et al. (2006) explain polarization trends in US wages and em-
ployment with the sharp decrease of computing power price and the related
diusion of computers. Since computerization is a global phenomenon that
has also been aecting Continental Europe, we may expect that the labor
markets in Continental Europe and the US have reacted in a similar way to
the decline of the price of computers. Moreover, wages and employment in
many European countries are determined through bargaining between the
confederations of trade unions and the association of entrepreneurs and thus
they may not directly reect changes in labor demand and supply.
Figures 1 and 2 plot the changes in wages and employment by wage level
in Italy, showing a clear polarization pattern for wages - even bigger than in
the US - and no convexication in employment. This evidence can be easily
explained by the model in section 5. Indeed, according to our framework,
the more the union - or other labor market institutions - protects its mem-
bers, the more wages for low-skilled jobs tend to be high, to the detriment
of low-skill employment. Conversely, when the union's goal is not far from
the competitive equilibrium of the labor market, employment shares will
polarize.
Our evidence could be used as an empirical test in order to understand
the role played by labor market institutions. Therefore, the correspondence
between our theoretical predictions when ﬃ = 1 and the Italian trends may
suggest that labor market institutions in Italy have mainly protected em-
ployed workers, leading to a huge increase in manual wages to the detriment
of manual employment. In other words, the increase in the demand of man-
ual work induced by computerization - which in a competitive world would
have had a positive eect on both wage and employment - has raised only
manual wages.
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Labor market institutions avoid employment growth in manual jobs
through two channels: (i) they can keep their employment target constant;
(ii) they can oppose the shifts of routine workers to manual tasks by resist-
ing the fall in routine employment. 16
If only the rst channel is acted, we would conclude that institutions
prevent job polarization at the cost of growing low-skilled unemployment.
This is consistent with the growing dierence in unemployment rates of un-
skilled and other workers. 17 This political implication is mitigated by the
second channel, where in a unionized market, fewer workers leave routine
occupations.
In a competitive market, the drawbacks of computerization impact (i)
routine workers who decide to stay in R even with a lower wage per ef-
ciency unit and (ii) manual workers when the increase in manual labor
supply is greater than the increase in the labor demand. Conversely, in a
non-competitive market, routine workers have to pay all the drawbacks of
the technological shock: in terms of wage if they stay in R and in terms
of employment if they move. Furthermore, the bargaining process and its
eects on the labor decisions of routine workers lead to smaller substitution
between computers and labor input, which implies a lower degree of com-
puter capital adoption.
The Italian labor market experienced many deep changes during these
20 years. Therefore, the general tendencies presented in gures 1 and 2 may
not be representative of the entire period of analysis. Splitting our data into
two sub-periods, we observe that, from 1985 to 1996, the log ratio between
the 50th and the 5th percentile had declined by 0:11 percentage points, while
from 1996 to 2004, it declined only by 0:05. This means that in the mid-
1990s, wage polarization became weaker. As far as employment shares are
concerned, gure 3 shows that the employment growth in low-paid occupa-
tions from 1996 to 2004 is a bit higher than before. The share of worked
weeks in middle-paid occupations remains rather constant in the rst pe-
riod and tends denitely to decrease over the second one. Furthermore,
worker ows from middle-paid jobs to low-paid jobs increase signicantly
16The bigger the value of ﬃ, the lower the probability of nding a manual job and,
therefore, the lower the shift of workers from R to M when  declines.
17This dierence grew from 0.1 percentage points in 1993 to 2.3 in 2005.
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after the mid-1990s: from 1995 to 2004, the number of workers who shifted
from receiving middle wages (30-60 percentiles) to receiving low wages (1-30
percentiles) increased by 33% (14% in the previous ten years). Thus, in
the second sub-period, we observe a light employment polarization and a
weak wage convexication. These results could be related to a decline in
the value of ﬃ and are consistent with the increasing degree of competition
of the Italian labor market.
Figure 1.3: Changes in employment shares by occupation. Occupations are sorted by
the average weekly wage paid in 1985 and 1996. Source: WHIP, 1985-2004.
In order to assess the important role of labor market institutions and
the interactions between them and the computerization process, we should
also extend the predictions of our model to other countries. Noteworthy is
that labor market institutions play a weaker role in the US than in Europe.
It is interesting to note that the US case is consistent with our model when
ﬃ < 1.
As far as continental Europe is concerned, Dustmann et al. (2007) show
that in Germany, as in Italy, wage inequality increased in the 1980s but only
at the top of the wage distribution. In the lower tail, inequality tends to in-
crease, and about one-third of this increase can be related to de-unionization.
This suggests once more that the lower tail of the wage distribution is cru-
cially inuenced by the labor market institutions.
According to Goos et al. (2009), in France, Austria and Denmark, there
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is also not an increase in the employment share of low-paid occupations
from 1993 to 2006. In Belgium, Greece and Spain, there is only a very weak
increase.
1.7 Conclusions
Autor et al. (2006) have explained in a cogent way the US polariza-
tion evidence through demand shifts induced by computerization. Given
that the technological change has been a global transformation, it would be
reasonable to think that it has generated the same eects in all advanced
countries.
In spite of this, the comparison between wage and employment patterns
of the US and some European countries (e.g., Italy, France and Spain) shows
a clear discrepancy. During the period 1988-2004, the US labor market was
characterized by a clear job polarization trend. Conversely, in Continental
Europe, the employment share of low-paid jobs did not increase at all (or
only slightly increased). In Italy particular, the lack of job polarizarion has
come with: (i) an increasing dierence in the unemployment rates of low-
skilled workers and overall workers and (ii) a huge polarization in wages.
In order to explain these patterns, we propose a theoretical framework
that captures national peculiarities in the institutional environment. In par-
ticular, we give voice to the role played by unions in the process of wage
setting. In our model, the union can choose to adopt dierent policies de-
pending on its employment target. As a result, labor market institutions
regulate the trade-o between low-skilled wage growth and low-skilled em-
ployment growth.
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Chapter 2
Too Much or Too Little
Immigration? Evidence from
Non-Tradable Services
2.1 Introduction
This study focuses on time-intensive services that directly substitute for
household production. This sector has special relevance because its func-
tioning is correlated with key issues in the economic and political debate,
in particular the female labor supply. These time-intensive services are a
natural trait d'union between highly skilled laborers whose time represents
a high opportunity cost, and low-skilled workers who sell services on the
market. The externalization of home production allows skilled workers to
engage in more productive occupations and increases job opportunities for
less skilled workers. In the aggregate, this externalization increases the na-
tional GDP (Alesina and Ichino, 2009).
We focus on the Italian case, which is particularly interesting because
of the low female labor supply with respect to that of other advanced
economies. The opportunity for women to participate in the labor mar-
ket strictly depends on the availability of time-intensive services that are
close substitutes for household production. Hence, we want to consider the
Italian labor market for these services to verify whether it could be respon-
sible in some way for female decisions to not supply labor.
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From a policy point of view, the policy-maker could use many potential
methods to increase the female labor supply. In this paper, we focus on the
least expensive solution, which is relaxing restrictive immigration policies to
increase the private service supply.
The argument against immigration tends to be that immigrants displace
Italian workers, reducing wages and job opportunities in the labor market.
This idea plays a crucial role in the implementation of restrictive immigra-
tion policies. Conversely, however, Cortes and Tessada (2007) show that
immigration has had a positive eect on the female labor supply in the US
because immigrants increase the supply and lower the price of housekeeping
services. A higher supply of labor in these market sectors could in principle
have a positive eect on the native labor supply. Given that immigrants in
Italy are highly concentrated in services that substitute for home production,
all of these restrictive immigration policies could actually be discouraging
female labor participation.
We use Italian administrative data on wages and employment at a provin-
cial level from the Italian social security institute (INPS). We select all
household services and observe changes over time in weeks worked and
weekly real wages. We nd that both wages and weeks worked have in-
creased over time and that they are positively correlated across provinces
and time. This evidence reveals that the demand for time-intensive services
has grown more rapidly over time than the supply despite the massive mi-
gration inows.
Next, we verify that our pattern is compatible with a demand-side shock
using an IV strategy. We instrument relative employment in time-intensive
services to determine the eects of a demand-side shock on relative wages.
Our instrument deals with the age structure of the population. We nd that
an increase of 1% in relative employment due to a demand-side shock would
increase relative wages by 0.2%. Thus, the demand for household services,
which is growing more than the supply, has led Italian families to pay more
for service externalization, providing incentives for women to stay home.
Finally, we exploit the eects of immigration on female labor partici-
pation. In fact, a weaker restrictive immigration policy could in principle
increase the service supply and lower prices. We look at the causal eect
Chapter 2 25
of immigration on natives' decisions to participate in the labor market. We
use an IV strategy, instrumenting the share of immigrants with the interac-
tion between previous settlements of immigrants in Italian provinces and an
arguably exogenous supply-push factor. More specically, we use an OECD
index that captures the credit and political risk of each country of origin
of Italian immigrants. We nd that immigration tends to lower the proba-
bility of a female's not supplying labor; conversely, it has no eect on male
decisions to supply labor.
The paper is organized as follows. After a brief survey of the related
literature, we present the main characteristics of the supply and demand for
services related to household production in Sections 3 and 4. In Sections 5
and 6, we propose our empirical analysis. Section 7 provides a conclusion.
2.2 Literature
Many papers focus on low-skill services to determine the eects of im-
migration on the labor markets of destination countries. 1 Some authors
argue that immigrants reduce the wage paid to natives with similar charac-
teristics. Others show that immigrants and natives with similar observable
characteristics are imperfect substitutes in production, and therefore, the
former do not compete with the latter in the job market (Ottaviano and
Peri, 2008). Indeed, immigrants and natives have dierent specializations
across economic sectors: foreign-born workers are concentrated in the agri-
cultural sector and personal services while natives tend to work in manufac-
turing and mining (Peri and Sparber, 2009).
Other papers deal with the eects of immigration on prices for services.
Cortes (2008) focuses on the inuence of low-skilled immigrants on the prices
of non-tradable goods and services in the US. She nds that a 10-percent
increase in the share of low-skilled immigrants in the labor force decreases
the price of immigrant-intensive services by 2 percent. Frattini (2008) deals
with the UK case and nds that immigration reduces price growth in ser-
vices with a high concentration of low-skilled immigrants.
1There is a signicant body of literature on the eect of migration inows on the labor
market. See Okkerse (2008) for a review.
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Finally, Cortes and Tessada (2007) and Barone and Mocetti (2009) ob-
serve that low-skilled immigrants work disproportionately in service sectors
that are close substitutes for household production. Starting from that ob-
servation, they claim that low-skilled immigration could aect the time-use
decisions of natives, thus increasing the labor supply. In particular, Cortes
and Tessada (2007) show that a reduction in the cost of services as induced
by low-skilled immigration would increase hours worked by women with
graduate degrees in the US. In addition, they nd that immigration lowers
the amount of time that highly skilled women spend at home and increases
reported expenditures on housekeeping services.
2.3 Immigration and Service Supply
According to the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat), im-
migrants in Italy are highly specialized in domestic activities. Figure 2.1
shows the immigrant specialization index across market sectors. This index
is the ratio between the share of immigrants in a certain sector over the total
number of immigrants over the share of Italian workers in the same sector.
When the ratio takes a value of 1, native-born and foreign-born workers are
present in the sector in the same proportion. Despite the high concentration
of immigrants in every low-skill sector (i.e., agriculture and construction),
immigrants' degree of specialization in household services is truly signicant
2; the share of foreign-born individuals in this sector is more than 11 times
the share of Italians. Furthermore, this is the only labor market that hires
more immigrants than natives. 3
Immigrants' specializing in household services probably reects their
lower reservation wages, which is consistent with their need for a job to
stay in Italy. In fact, this is the worst paid sector of the economy, with
an average wage in 2004 that is 19 percent lower than the average wages
across other low-skilled jobs. The labor market for services that substitute
for home production activities is very low-skill. Figure 2.2 shows that 97%
2In Household services Istat includes all services to families (baby-sitting, assistance,
cleaning services).
3See Cortes and Tessada (2007) and Peri (2006) for similar evidence on the US.
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Figure 2.1: Immigrant specialization across market sectors (Istat, 2008).
of the workers in this sector do not have high-school diplomas.
Figure 2.2: Educational composition of employment across market sectors (Istat, 2001).
In recent years, immigration in Italy has increased even more than in
other advanced economies. According to the Istat Census data, the amount
of foreigners in 2001 was four times the amount of foreigners in 1991. Fur-
thermore, their presence is still growing: from 2008 to 2009 alone, the num-
ber of regular immigrants increased by 13.4 percent. Currently, regular
immigrants represent almost 6 percent of the population. According to the
OECD (2007), immigrants in Italy are, on average, younger and less quali-
ed than those from abroad.
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This substantial increase has certainly generated a supply-side shock in
the labor market for services that substitute for home production. It is rea-
sonable to expect that this shock has had a negative eect on the wages
paid in this sector and a positive impact on weeks worked.
2.4 Home Production and Service Demand
The demand side of services that substitute for home production is
strictly correlated with female participation in the labor market. Indeed, it
is common knowledge that women spend more time than do men on house-
hold production. Therefore, the possibility of outsourcing home production,
buying services on the market, may provide a way for women to devote a
higher fraction of the day to paid work. After Malta, Italy is the country
with the highest percentage of women who are not looking for a job (27:1%
of women 25-34 years old, 30:5% of women 35-44 years old and 19:1% of
women 45-54 years old). Burda et al. (2006) develop a cross-country anal-
ysis (US, Germany, Italy and Netherlands), from which three interesting
aspects emerge: (i) male-female dierences in the allocation of time be-
tween market work and household production are smaller in the US than in
the EU countries (among them, Italy is the country with the highest index
of gender inequality); (ii) women spend more time on household production
than do men in all countries; and (iii) Italy is the only country in which
women work (market work and household production combined) more than
do men, despite the fact that Italian women spend much less time than
men on market activities. This evidence sheds light on the potential role of
the externalization of home production in female participation in the labor
market.
We expect that female participation is strictly correlated with (i) the
individual opportunity cost of time (gain from externalization) and (ii) the
market price of services that substitute for home production (cost of exter-
nalization). Figure 3 shows the family consumption shares in dierent types
of services by women's educational level. As expected, the higher the level
of education, the higher the consumption share for services that substitute
for home production. This is perfectly consistent with the fact that highly
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skilled women experience a higher opportunity cost and thus nd the ex-
ternalization of home production more convenient. Figure 2.3 for instance
shows that families with high-skilled women have higher consumption shares
in assistance and food preparing services.
Figure 2.3: Consumption shares in non-tradable services by woman educational level
(Istat, 2001).
Furthermore, Figure 2.4 shows the correlation at the provincial level be-
tween the activity rate for highly skilled women and relative wages in such
services that substitute home production. The estimated coecient from an
OLS regression of the two variables reveals that this correlation is signi-
cant (at 1%). As expected, highly skilled female participation is negatively
correlated with service wages.
In last decades, many changes could have increased the demand of house-
hold services. In Italy there has been an inuential growth in families with
only one individual in age of working. This change in family composition has
probably induced many inactive women to participate in the labor market
(during the 1995-2005 period, there was an increase of 6 percentage points
in the female participation rate).
Furthermore, the aging population has led to a massive increase in the
demand of assistance.
We expect that both these phenomena represent a demand side shock in
household services, with consequences in terms of both wages and employ-
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Figure 2.4: The correlation between the provincial participation rates for highly skilled
women and relative wages for services related to home production over other low-skilled
wages (Istat and INPS, 2000) .
ment in this labor market.
2.5 Empirical Evidence
2.5.1 Data and Methodology
We aim to analyze the labor market for household services with particular
reference to the pattern of wages and employment over time. We want to
verify whether there is an increasing demand for these services due to the
growing externalization of home production by Italian families.
We use administrative data from the Italian social security institute from
1998 to 2004. This archive provides information on all labor contracts for
employees hired in the private sector and born on four particular days of the
year. We collected data on (i) the sum of monthly wages paid every year (in-
cluding extra wages); (ii) the number of weeks paid; (iii) the province where
the work took place; and (iv) worker sector and qualications. In particu-
lar, we achieved signicant detail (5-digit variables) regarding the denition
of the workers' sectors of activity. Given this detail, we can easily identify
services that substitute for home production. We include everything that
people can produce directly or buy on the market. This causes us to include
non-tradable, time-intensive sectors spanning from repair services, cleaning
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services, and surveillance to food preparation and personal services. 4
We run the following regressions to verify the trend of weekly wages and
weeks worked:
log
W spt
Wpt
= + Trendt + p + pt (2.1)
log
Weeksspt
Weekspt
=  + ﬃTrendt + p + pt (2.2)
where W s is the average wage for household services and W is the aver-
age wage in all sectors; we include province (p) xed eects. The estimated
coecients for the two linear trends reveal the expected annual changes in
relative weeks worked and relative weekly wages in time-intensive services
over the entire economy. If both of the coecients are positive, we must con-
clude that weeks worked and wages have increased more for these services
than in other sectors because of a growing demand on the part of Italian
families. Conversely, if  is negative and ﬃ positive, it is probable that the
labor supply has increased more than the demand.
Furthermore, we look at the correlation between wages and weeks worked
using the following specication, which includes year and region xed eects,
and the interaction of the two:
log
W spt
Wpt
=  + !log
Weeksspt
Weekspt
+ r + t + rt + pt: (2.3)
A positive correlation will reveal a crucial role for the relative demand
for household services; conversely, a negative correlation would be observed
after a supply-push shock.
From a methodological point of view, a simple supply and demand frame-
work is used to analyze changes in the Italian household service sector. We
study the patterns of wages and employment to determine the behavior of
the demand and supply of household services as did Katz and Murphy (1992)
to verify the eects of a skill-biased technological change on the US wage
structure. We nd that ,  and ! are positive. To check whether these
4Our denition is consistent with that of Mazzolari and Ragusa (2004).
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results derive from a demand-side shock, we must verify that the shape
of the service supply curve is consistent with this simple demand-supply
framework. In other words, we want to verify whether a demand-side shock
increases both wages and weeks worked. We do this by estimating the elas-
ticity of the relative supply.
Thus, we again estimate 2.3 using an instrument for a shock on the de-
mand side: the share of elderly people in a province in a certain year over
the entire population. 5 Indeed, the Istat consumption survey reveals that
families with at least one elderly person exhibit a greater service consump-
tion share on average (gure 2.5).
In an ordinary framework with an upward sloping labor supply, we should
also see a positive ! in the IV strategy.
Figure 2.5: Service consumption shares for families with at least one child, families with
at least one elderly person and other families (Istat 2001).
2.5.2 Results: A Demand-Side Shock
According to INPS data, the number of weeks worked in household ser-
vices has dramatically increased over time (on average, by 6.5 percent per
year from 1998 to 2004.) Nominal weekly wages in the same sector have in-
creased by 4.5 percent per year on average. These results also remain valid
in relative terms: the share of weeks worked in household services over the
total number of weeks worked has increased every year by 1.4 percentage
5We consider an elderly person someone over 80 years old.
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points on average, while relative wages have increased by 0.7. Table 2.1
shows the estimated results of the regressions for relative wages and relative
employment on an annual linear trend, controlling for province-related xed
eects. The two estimated coecients are both signicant at 1 percent. Ev-
ery year, there is an expected increase of 0.5 percent in relative wages and
of 3.5 in relative employment.
Italy has implemented several regularizations in recent years that have
oered irregular immigrants the opportunity to obtain a residence permit.
The most important of these regularizations was probably introduced in
2002; it involved 700 thousand individuals. For our purposes, such regular-
izations are important because they lead to an increase in the amount of
regular employment, which does not reect an increase in actual employ-
ment. Table 1 splits our period of analysis in two sub-periods to verify
whether the regularization is the only factor explaining our results. We
nd that prior to and since 2002, our estimated coecient for the annual
linear trend has been signicant at 1%. Columns (2) and (6) display the
results using construction as a reference sector. Because this is another Ital-
ian market where labor demand has increased over time and it has a high
share of irregular labor, this choice should reduce the probability that the
regularizations are aecting our results. Even with respect to construction,
relative wages and relative employment in services that substitute for home
production have increased over time.
Rel W Rel Empl
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trend/100 0:48 0:62 3:50 4:07 4:11 1:62
(0:14) (0:000) (0:16) (0:45) (0:64) (0:34)
Prov FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 2.1: (1) is the regression of relative wages on an annual linear trend with province
xed eects; (3) does the same for relative employment; (4) uses data on relative employ-
ment only before 2002; (5) only uses data since 2002. (2) and (6) use as their dependent
variables relative average wage and relative weeks worked in time-intensive services over
construction. All dependent variables are in log form. The results (except in col. 2)
remain signicant at the 1% level, even clustering standard errors by year.
Furthermore, we observe a positive correlation between relative wages
and relative employment (table 2 ). This correlation is signicant controlling
for regional, annual xed eects and the interaction between the two.
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Wages Relative Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Rel) Empl 0:11 0:15 0:15 0:14 :14 0:10
(0:01) (0:01) (0:01) (0:01) (0:01) (0:01)
Region FE Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Region X Year FE No No No No Yes No
lPop X X X X X X
Irregulars X
Table 2.2: (1) is the regression of average wages in time-intensive services over weeks
worked; (2) is relative wages over relative employment without any control variable; (3)
controls for year xed eects. (4) includes regional xed eects and the relative share
of irregular input in these services over the entire economy (estimated by Istat); (5) has
regional, year xed eects and the interaction between the two; in (6) the reference sector
is construction. All variables are in logs.
Because both employment and wages tend to increase over time, and
they are positively correlated, we argue for an important role of demand for
household services. This implies that the supply of time-intensive services
is sloping upward. Thus, one positive demand-side shock should lead to
positive co-variation in employment and wages. To verify that an increase
in the demand for household services is consistent with our observed pattern
of wages and employment, we estimate the elasticity of the supply of house-
hold services. We present instrumental variable estimates of the relationship
between relative wages and relative employment obtained by instrumenting
employment with an arguably exogenous measure of home service demand.
The instrument is the share of elderly people in the province in a certain
year. 6
A problem of endogeneity could arise if the share of elderly people is
greater in places away from which young skilled people tend to move. In
these provinces, there will be a simultaneously high incidence of elderly per-
sons and low-skilled workers. Because household services are the least skilled
sector, this correlation could aect our estimates in some way. Indeed, we
control for the log of the population in the province in that year. Our results
are presented in table 3 .
We estimate the elasticity of the relative supply of household services to
6We dene an elderly person as someone who is at least 80 years old.
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Relative Wages (IV) Wages (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Rel) Employment 0:22 0:23 0:21 0:16 0:35
(0:09) (0:09) (0:08) (0:10) (0:10)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes No
Region X Year FE No Yes No No No
lPop X X X X X
Irregulars X X
Stat F rst stage 11 10 13 10 13
Table 2.3: In (1), (2) and (3), we regress log relative wages on log relative weeks worked
in time-intensive services over the entire economy; in (4) and (5), we regress log wages
in time-intensive services over log weeks worked. The instrument is the share of elderly
persons.
be equal to 0.2. This means that an increase of 1% in relative employment
due to an increase in the demand for services that substitute for home pro-
duction should increase relative wages by 0:2%.
2.6 Service Supply and Female Labour Partecipa-
tion
2.6.1 Data and Methodology
A further step in the analysis is to verify whether there is a correlation
between relative wages in household services versus those of other low-wage
jobs and the participation rates of highly skilled women.
We use data from the Italian labor force survey (Istat) from 1998 to
2003 at the individual level. This dataset provides information on marital
status, hours worked, professional status, age and education level. We use
information on females from 15 to 64 years old. Furthermore, we select only
skilled females to ensure that the correlation is not related to a possible
specialization of women in low-skilled, time-intensive service sectors. We
estimate the following:
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Iit = +Edit+Expit+ Exp
2
it+ﬃMarriedit+ﬀ
W spt
Wpt
+r+ t+rt+ it
(2.4)
where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that is equal to one
when the individual does not supply labor because of family reasons (child-
care, elderly persons care), p is the province, and r is the region. We con-
trol for years of schooling, experience, experience2 and marital status. We
exclude females who do not supply labor for other reasons. We include re-
gional, annual xed eects and the interaction between the two.
Next, we want to verify whether a particular supply-side shock in the
labor market of services would increase female activity rates. We focus
on the eects of immigration on the female labor supply, claiming that
immigrants, by increasing the labor supply in this sector, have led native
women to change their time-use decisions.
Barone and Mocetti (2009) also deal with this issue using Italian data.
They study the eects of immigration on the number of weeks worked by
highly skilled women. We exploit the extensive issue and among inactive
women (or men) we select those who are not supplying labor because of
their families. This focus makes our data more appropriate for the analysis.
More specically, we estimate the eect of immigration on the probability
that an individual does not supply labor because of child/elderly care. We
run separate regression for males and females.
In the rst regression, again the dependent variable is a dummy variable
that is equal to one when the individual does not supply labor for family
reasons (childcare or caring for the elderly). Again, we include in our sample
all men and women of working age except the ones who do not supply labor
for other reasons. We use the following specication:
Iit = +Edit+ Expit+Exp
2
it+Marriedit+ ﬃImmShlt+p+ t+ it
(2.5)
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where p is the province, t the year (2004-2007), l is the local labor dis-
trict and i is the individual. We also control for years of schooling, years of
experience, the square of experience and marital status. OLS estimates are
probably biased by the fact that immigrants will choose their destination
city depending on wages. Hence, we also run an IV regression.
We propose a new instrument for migration inows: we instrument the
share of immigrants in the labor force with a variable that directly reects
the supply-push component of immigration. In particular, we interact the
share of immigrants coming from a certain country (n) in a certain province
in the rst quarter of 1995 with an index (In;t) that measures the instability
of institutions in countries of origin in every year of the analysis. This index,
from the OECD Consensus Country Classications, is the most frequently
used in risk ratings for most public credit and political risk insurers. The
OECD classies countries into eight risk categories (0 - 7). This classi-
cation is produced for the purpose of setting minimum premium rates for
transactions covered by the Export Credit Arrangement. Furthermore, the
OECD takes into account the political risk associated with a country to
consider the likelihood that the country will not service its external debt.
Slt =
X
n
(
Immn;l;1995
Imml;1995
tX
ﬁ=1999
In;ﬁ ): (2.6)
Thus, the identication strategy relies on the fact that the instability of
institutions is positively correlated with migration inows from developing
countries. Furthermore, the political stability of countries of origin is ex-
ogenous to demand-pull factors in Italian provinces. We test the correlation
between inows from every country and I through an OLS regression of I
on changes in immigration to Italy by country of origin from 2002 to 2006,
controlling for country xed eects. We achieve a positive estimated coe-
cient that is signicant at the 1% level. 7
7Even including only the 30 countries that we use in our instrument or estimating an
ordered probit.
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2.6.2 Results
The rst evidence that we attain deals with relative wages for household
services and female activity rates. Table 2.4 shows estimation results from
regression 2.4.
Females Males
RelWages/100 6:21 0:26
(0:47) (0:25)
Exp 1:91  0:22
(0:01) (0:01)
Exp2  0:01 0:01
(0:00) (0:00)
Ed/100 0:14  0:51
(0:02) (0:01)
Married 0:30  0:03
(0:00) (0:00)
Region FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Region X Year FE Yes Yes
Table 2.4: We exclude individuals who do not supply labor for other reasons. The
results remain signicant even when standard errors are clustered at the provincial level.
The F statistic in the rst stage is higher then 10.
The higher the relative wages are for services that substitute for home
production, the higher the probability is that a woman does not supply la-
bor. The eect is not signicant for males.
Next, we look at the eects of immigration on labor supply of high-skilled
women. We focus on the eects of immigration on the probability a gradu-
ated female does not supply labor because of family-related constraints.
By instrumenting immigration with Sl;t, we estimate that an increase of
1 percentage point in the immigrant share (i.e. from 6 to 7 percent) would
reduce by 0.1 percent points the probability that a women does not supply
labor because of her family. This means that doubling immigration would
reduce this probability by 0.6 percentage points. The same coecient is not
statistically signicant for males.
Note that the eects of immigration on the female labor supply are much
higher than those of relative wages. This is probably true for two reasons:
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(i) immigration lowers the price of services not only by reducing wages (and
thus production costs) but even by increasing competition in these markets;
and (ii) immigrants increase female participation to the labor market, not
only lowering prices but also increasing the supply of services that substitute
for home production.
OLS IV
Imm. Sh.  0:21  10:23
(0:13) (2:13)
Ed  0:02  0:07
(0:00) (0:00)
Exp 0:33 0:38
(0:38) (0:36)
Exp2 0:00 0:00
(0:00) (0:00)
Marital Status 0:13 0:13
(0:00) (0:00)
Province FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Table 2.5: We exclude females who do not supply labor for other reasons. The results
remain signicant even when standard errors are clustered at the LLD level. The F-stat
in the rst stage is greater than 10.
2.7 Conclusion
This analysis reveals that in Italy, the demand for services that substi-
tute for household production has increased more than the supply. In fact,
both wages and employment in household services have increased signi-
cantly over time and the changes are positively correlated across provinces
and time. We check this nding by estimating the elasticity of the relative
supply curve. We nd that an increase of 1% in relative employment due
to an increase in the demand for services that substitute home production
increases relative wages by 0.2%.
Because service demand has increased more than supply, Italian families
have paid increasing costs for home production externalization. In order to
increase the low rate of female labor market participation, an increase in
service supply would be a desired policy outcome. The policy maker has
many alternative ways to do that: it could directly provide services (i.e.,
40 Chapter 2
nurseries, kindergarten, elderly care), or it could help families to nd them
in the market. In particular, we focus on a possible solution (certainly the
most economical): a less restrictive immigration policy.
We show that a greater presence of immigrants at the province level
would increase the female labor supply by decreasing the probability that a
woman does not work because of her family.
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Chapter 3
Intrinsic motivation and the
allocation of tasks: theory
and evidence
3.1 Introduction
The principal-agent literature has been enriched noticeably by the multitask-
ing framework developed by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Analyzing the
optimal incentive scheme when the agent carries out more than one tasks,
they point out two crucial elements. First, there could be interactions be-
tween tasks such that an increase in the agent's compensation for one task
causes some reallocation of attention away from other tasks (crowding out
eect). Secondly, they raise the issue of performance measurability. It is
possible that the dierent activities the agent performs are not observable
in the same way.
The standard principal-agent theory concernes with extrinsic work mo-
tivation.Recently, the empirical evidence and the interaction with other dis-
ciplines (psychology and sociology) have made clear that some workers are
willing to provide eort not only for pecuniary reasons. Some agents take
their eort decisions considering also their intrinsic motivation (e.g., Pred-
ergast 2007, Besley and Ghatak 2005)1. Intrinsic motivation relates to ac-
1Agents may be intrinsically motivated to work for dierent reasons. One might simply
like to undertake some activities and the evaluation of intrinsic qualities of dierent jobs
may vary across people. Intrinsic motivation may be related also to \self-esteem". In this
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tivities an agent likes doing or to a situation in which an agent derives
some satisfaction from doing her duty. When the worker cares about what
she does in addition to what she is paid, her eort choice is strongly inu-
enced by the presence of intrinsic motivation, because \the task in itself or
the task for the attainment of a given goal become intrinsically rewarding"
(Galbraith, 1977).
In this paper, I enrich the Holmstrom and Milgrom's framework (1991)
by formally introducing intrinsic motivation. The interest for this kind of
analysis arises from two dierent evidences. First, there are jobs for which
intrinsic motivations is particularly relevant (Besley and Ghatak 2005); this
means that the degree of the agent's motivation for the job can aect the
eort she provides. Among the dierent tasks the agent carries out, some
are related to intrinsic motivation, while others are not, e.g. taking care
of patients is an intrinsically motivated task for nurses, while bureaucratic
tasks are not. In the rest of the paper I consider task 1 the motivational
one, that for which the agent feels motivated, and task 2 the non motiva-
tional one. This heterogeneity aects the cost of eort the agent bears to
performs the activities. Even if the agent carries out both motivational and
non motivational task, she gets intrinsic benets only from the performance
of task 1. Secondly, the dierent degree of tasks measurability is dierent
for motivational and non-motivational tasks. Generally, tasks more related
to the agent's intrinsic motivation are those more dicult to measure. Two
examples are useful to further clarify this point. Teachers, usually, carry
out other tasks in addition to teaching the basic skills that are tested on
standarized exams: promoting curiosity and creative thinking, rening stu-
dents' oral and written communication skills,etc. It is reasonable to think
that the eort a teacher exerts in these tasks is more related to her intrinsic
motivation than to extrinsic incentives (such as career concerns). Evidently,
all the activities in the second category are hardly measurable, unlike the
former.
The second example are nurses. Nurses carry out dierent duties to take
care of patients. While it is quite easy to measure how many injections they
do or how many medications they provide to patients, it is dicult to mea-
case an agent is intrinsically motivated to work because it makes him think better about
himself. Again, people may have intrinsic motivation to work in a given organization for
the goal that is pursued in such organization.
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sure the overall attention to the patient's well being, i.e. the way in which
they take care of the patients, how they provide treatments (e.g. injection
can be given in a more or less lovely way). The manner in which treatments
are provided is related to nurses' intrinsic motivation. The nurse's case sug-
gests that the measurability problem not always relates directly the task but
to the way in which it is carried out, the devotion and the quality.
The previous examples highlight a link between the intrinsic motivation
embodied in a given task and the problem of its measurability. As a con-
sequence, intrinsic motivation inuences the otpimal incentives in a multi-
tasking enviroment. The rst goal of this paper is to study this aspect in a
formal way.
In the model the principal has to dene the optimal wage scheme for an
agent who carries out task 1 and task 2. The intrinsic motivation enters
the cost function and it acts in two ways: i) it makes the eort for the
motivational task less costly than the eort exerted for the other task; ii) it
generates an interdependency between the two activities.
In analyzing the incentive scheme, there emerges indirect moral crowding
out eect, such that providing monetary incentives for the task not related
with intrinsic motivation leads the agent to exert less eort in the moti-
vational activity. This eect is the trait d'union between the multitasking
framework and the literature on motivation. Indeed, on one hand, Holm-
strom and Milgrom (1991) introduce a simple crowding out eect and, on
the other hand, the work of Frey(1999) presents the moral crowding out
eect, according to which the intrinsic motivation is weakened by the provi-
sion of extrinsic reward aimed to provide incentives for the activity directly
related to motivation. Taking into account, in the same theoretical frame-
work, the distinctive elements of both literature, gives rise to the indirect
moral crowding out eect.
The mechanism acting in the model is the following. In a job for which
motivation matters, workers are, on average, motivated, even if there is het-
erogeneity with respect to their degree of intrinsic motivation. Therefore,
the specic nature of the tasks they have to fulll becomes crucial to dene
the incentive mechanism. A standard agent interested only in the extrinsic
reward is indierent in carrying out task 1 or task 2 : what matters is that
she has to exert a given level of eort to get an extrinsic remuneration. On
the contrary, for a motivated agent, carrying out motivational task is in itself
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a source of satisfaction, given the intrinsic benet she gets from it. Despite
the dierent relation with motivation, both tasks have to be done and the
agent has a timing constraint. This implies that the extrinsic incentives pro-
vided by the principal to induce the agent to allocate her time among the
two tasks is a critical point, because taking time away from the motivational
task could reduces eort through its negative eect on (intrinsic) incentives.
Indeed, providing incentive to task 2 lenas the opportunity cost of task 1 to
increase and the agent substitutes eort away from motivational activity to
which intrinsic benet -that reduces the cost of eort - is associated. Conse-
quently, the eort provided for the motivational task - that is generally the
main activity for a job for which motivation matters - is reduced. In this
context it can emerge a moral crowding out eect whose source is the task
allocation. If we have to assign more than one task to a motivated worker
it is necessary to consider the impact that each of them could have on her
intrinsic motivation (are they coherent with it or not? Could they induce a
moral crowding out eect?)2.
To solve the model I assume that the eort exerted for the motivational
task is not observable and therefore, in the wage scheme, it is not possible
to dene an extrinsic incentive for it. On the other hand, the optimal value
of extrinsic incentive for the other activity is decreasing in the agent's de-
gree of intrinsic motivation: more motivated workers should be given less
incentives to carry out this kind of task. As a consequence, the best the
principal can do is to set a xed wage , if the agent has a high degree of
intrinsic motivation. This results from the simultaneous presence of intrinsic
motivation and tasks measurability problem in the theoretical framework.
The result gives rise to the following question: how can we provide incentives
to intrinsically motivated workers without using extrinsic rewards directly
related to each task? The primary mechanism acting in the model suggests
that job organization and tasks allocation may provide a valid answer. It is
possible to have two dierent ways of incentive provision: the usual mon-
etary payment and the task allocation, i.e. the denition of the workday
fraction devoted to dierent activities. The model implies that the best
policy is to exploit the tasks characteristics in terms of intrinsic motivation
2Moreover, if the principal handles with many agents, heterogeneous with respect to
intrinsic motivation, it is also important to understand what is the best task allocation
among them, in order to obtain the highest level of eort.
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to, thus, increase the benet the agent gets from her job and, consequently,
raise the level of eort by the reduction of its cost.
The possibility to implement such strategy is related to the observability of
the agent's degree of intrinsisic motivation. I assume that it is observable,
as other authors do (Besley and Ghatak, 2004; Francois, 2000).
In the last part of the paper I want to verify the validity of this kind of
incentive mechanism developing an empirical analysis.
I use data relative to nurses coming from the National Sample Survey of
US registered nurses for the year 2004. This dataset provides many demo-
graphic and working information. Among them, the most interesting for
my analysis are those related to the percentage of workweek spent in dier-
ent typologies of tasks, the self-declared job satisfaction and the amount of
overtime hours for each nurse.
The choice of this particular class of workers is motivated by the fact that
nursing is a job where intrinsic motivation is relevant and workers can be
motivated (and, on average, they are)3.
The aim of the empirical analysis is twofold. First, I want to verify if a
relation between the tasks allocation and the job satisfaction exists. What
emerges is that the time spent directly with patients and doing activities
closely related to care (task 1) impact in a positive way on the self-declared
job satisfaction. The opposite occurs when I consider the time spent in
other tasks not directly related with patients care (tasks 2: administration,
consultation, supervision, research, teaching). Then, I investigate if task
allocation is correlated to nurses' eort decision and in which way. In order
to analyze this point I run a regression whose dependent variable is a proxy
of nurses' eort - the amount of voluntary overtime - and the covariate is
the task allocation. What I get is a positive impact of direct patients care
on eort, while the impact of the other tasks is negative.
The empirical evidence corroborates the policy implication of the model:
tasks allocation mechanisms that take into account intrinsic motivation can
be good incentive instruments, since they have direct and indirect (through
3This statement is supported by evidence in nursing literature showing, for example,
that the loss of direct contact with patients - due to a job reorganization within hospital -
creates discontent among nurses and reduces their satisfaction (Clark et al., 2001).More-
over, it has been shown that the main source of nurses' satisfaction is related to relational
aspects (rst, relation with patients, then relation with colleagues) and one of the main
reason for nurses' dissatisfaction making them dissatised is the amount of administrative
duties they have to carry out (Shields and Ward, 2001)
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job satisfaction) impacts on the agent's eort decision.
3.2 Literature review on intrinsic motivation
Empirical evidence, in social and psychological sciences, shows that some
workers take their eort decisions considering the extrinsic and intrinsic
benets associated to their job. For this reason both these sources of incen-
tive have been introduced in the principal-agent theory.
Many authors (Heyes 2005, Delfgaauw and Dur 2007, Murdock 2002, Ben-
abou and Tirole 2003, Besley and Ghatak 2004) have studied the implica-
tions of the introduction of intrinsic motivation in the agent's decision pro-
cess. They focus, in particular, on how the presence of motivated/devoted
workers aects the optimal incentive contract. The following results are
particularly important. First, the presence of intrinsic motivation generally
decreases the importance of monetary incentives used to induce eort and
the optimal level of eort provided by the agent increases as well as the
prot of the principal. The second result concerns job design (the tasks
included in the job description, the activities excluded and the specication
of the working rules), that is an important incentive instrument to motivate
workers (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1994), especially if they are intrinsically
motivated. Indeed, in this case, also additional aspects of the organization
design (i.e. mission choice, the relational aspects, etc.) become important
to provide incentives, because they act on the agent's intrinsic motivation
which leads him to exert eort, even if extrinsic rewards are absent(Francois
2000, Besley and Ghatak 2004). Third, it emerges an interaction between
extrinsic and intrinsic work motivation and, consequently, extrinsic and in-
trinsic reward. This interaction can aect positively or negatively the total
amount of eort provided by the agent. An external intervention (as moni-
toring or monetary reward) on work performance imposed by the principal
can have two opposite eects: the rst concerns the extrinsic motivation
and implies that higher level of monitoring (through the imposition of a
higher marginal cost on shirking) has a discipline eect, or higher pecuniary
remuneration can induce more eort through the \extrinsic channel" . The
second eect acts on the intrinsic preferences. Monitoring may appear as
asignal of distrust to the agent, reducing his self-determination and shifting
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the \locus of control" away from him. Moreover, higher pecuniary remuner-
ation may decrease the intrinsic value of a given action, thereby reducing
in this way the eort provided by the person4. From a psychological point
of view this happens because the agent perceives an external intervention
as a controlto device and so his intrinsic motivation to perform the task
diminishes. If this second eect prevails (it depends on the weight of the in-
trinsic motivation and on the magnitude of the extrinsic reward) we observe
the \motivation crowding out eect". This phenomenon has been dened
by Bruno Frey (1997), according to whom \the motivation crowding eect
suggests that external intervention via monetary incentives or punishments
may undermine, and under dierent identiable conditions strengthen, in-
trinsic motivation". Frey has shown the empirical relevance of this eect: he
presents a large number of studies based on circumstantial evidence, labo-
ratory studies by both psychologists and economists as well as eld research
by econometric studies that show the existence of the moral crowding out
eect in dierent countries and periods of time 5. Frey argues that moral
crowding out is a relevant phenomenon that can, in specic cases, even dom-
inate the eect induced by extrinsic incentives.
The intrinsic motivation theory and the work of Frey have shown that when
an agent is intrinsically motivated it is necessary to be careful with respect
to the way in which extrinsic incentives are provided, to avoid that the in-
trinsic motivation is crowded out and, consequently, the agent provides less
eort.
Frey considers that the benet the agent gets from her job is B(Pi; Ei),
where Pi is the performance of activity i that provides itself utility, because
of the presence of intrinsic motivation, and Ei is the remuneration oered
by the principal for task i. The moral crowding out occurs when BPiEi < 0.
In this paper I introduce intrinsic motivation in a multitasking frame-
work, underlying the fact that the dierent degrees of tasks observability
can be related to the relation between tasks and intrinsic motivation. En-
riching multitasking and agency with intrinsic motivation, gives rise to the
4A clear example of this phenomenon is provided by Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997,
who analyze the \not in my backyard" problem. The willingness of a community to accept
a positive but \inconvenient" project (as an airport or a nuclear waste repository) falls if
it's compensated with monetary reward.
5See Frey and Jegen, 2001
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indirect moral crowding out eect, according to which the agent's benet
deriving from the performance of the motivational task can be decreased by
the monetary incentives provided for the other tasks not related with moti-
vation. Using the same terms of Frey, the indirect moral crowding out eect
occurs when BPiEj < 0, where Ej is the payment for the task not related to
intrinsic motivation that the agent has to carry out.
3.3 The model
This section explores the implications of the worker's intrinsic motivation
for the design of the optimal incentive scheme for a job consisting of two
dierent tasks.
I refer to the multi-tasking framework developed by Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1991) and introduce the agent's intrinsic motivation, the latter
interpreted as \task involvement", that is the degree to which a person
derives utility from the performance of a task.
I consider an agent who carries out two tasks, tasks 1 and 2. She can have
dierent degrees of intrinsic motivation. If she is not a motivated worker the
typology of the tasks is not a relevant point. However, the latter matters
a lot if she has both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation for the job, as I will
clarify in the section 3:2.
I dene the eort for the rst and second task respectively as a1 and a2
and assume that there is a one to one relationship between one unit of eort
and one unit of task.
The principal observes a signal of the agent's eort
x1 = a1 + "1
x2 = a2 + "2
where the error term " is normally distributed with mean zero and co-
variance matrix . From now on we assume that the two signals are inde-
pendent. The observability of the task, and the related issue of performance
measure, is a crucial element for the denition of the optimal incentive
scheme, as it will be claried later.
I consider an agent with constant absolute risk aversion and, therefore,
the risk neutral principal oers her a linear contract.6
6See Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987
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!(x1; x2) = 1x1 + 2x2 + 
The parameter 1 represents the monetary reward provided to incentivate
eort for task 1; 2 is the incentive parameter related to task 2 and the xed
part  satises the individual rationality constraint.
The certain equivalent of the agent's wage is
CE = 1x1 + 2x2 +    C(a1; a2) 
r
2

0

It consists of the expected wage minus C(a1; a2),the private cost of eort
for two tasks, and the risk premium. The term 
0
 is the variance of the
agent's income under the linear compensation scheme while r measures the
agent's risk aversion.
The prot of the principal directly depends on the eorts exerted in the
two activities since they determine both the output produced and the wage
paid. Since a1 and a2 are observed imperfectly by the principal, the prot
it is function of x1 and x2 and I assume that it is equal to B(x1; x2) =
x1 + x2   !(x1; x2) so that B(x1; x2) is increasing in both inputs.
Given that the principal's expected prot is E = (1   1)a1 + (1  
2)a2   , the joint surplus is a1 + a2   C(a1; a2)  
r
2
0
. The latter is
independent on the intercept term : in fact it simply represents a transfer
from the principal to the agent, necessary to satisfy the participation con-
straint and incentive neutral. As a consequence, the incentive-ecient linear
contract only includes the levels of eort and the incentive parameters i.
The principal denes the optimal contract maximizing the expected total
surplus under the incentive compatibility constraint of the agent. Thus
(ai ; 

i ) must be the solution of the following problem
max1;2a1 + a2   C(a1; a2) 
r
2

0
 (3.1)
s:t: argmaxa1;a21a1 + 2a2 +    C(a1; a2)
In the following I will dene the optimal value of the incentive parameters
considering at rst the benchmark case in which the agent is not intrinsically
motivated, and then the interesting case of the motivated worker.
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3.3.1 The \standard" agent and the independence of tasks
under full information
I consider a standard agent who draws motivation for her job only from
extrinsic rewards. Therefore, spending time performing task 1 rather than
task 2 is the same, since they don't dier in terms of their relation with
intrinsic motivation. This implies that the two tasks are independent in
the agent's cost function and consequently the Hessian matrix is diagonal.
Finally, I consider that in this case both tasks are observable and measurable
(in my framework observability is related to intrinsic motivation).
To dene the optimal incentive scheme I consider that a1and a2 are
strictly positive and from the incentive compatibility constraint I get i =
C
0
i(a1; a2), where subscripts on C denote partial derivatives.
Inserting the latter in the rst-order necessary condition for an optimum
in problem (1) I obtain the optimal value of the incentive parameters
i =
1
1 + rﬀ2iC
00
ii
(3.2)
i is the same that the principal would oer if he had considered the
tasks separately. This happens because the cost of inducing the agent to
perform any given task is independent on the other task. Noteworthy, I nd
here the standard moral hazard framework, in which incentives are weaker
the higher the risk aversion (r) and the risk (ﬀ2i ) and they are stronger more
responsive to incentives the agent is.
3.3.2 The motivated agent and the dependence of tasks
Now I consider an agent having a vocation for her job. As an examplary
case, I refer to a nurse, who has to carry out nursing (task 1)and bureucratic
(task 2) activities. In this case 1 is the main task, the activity having a posi-
tive relation with the agent's intrinsic motivation. It is the task that reects
the worker's motivation for the job and from whose performance she gets
benet. For this reason the agent is induced to exert eort in 1 not only by
pecuniary incentives, but also by the intrinsic ones. In the nurse's case task
1 is the caring activity, but there are many other examples, as the medical
activity for a physician, the teaching of higher-thinking skills for a teacher,
the research activity for academic people. On the other hand task 2, the
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secondary task, is an activity that does not reect the agent's intrinsic mo-
tivation and it is not correlated with the motivational characteristics of the
job for which motivation matters. Consider, for example, the bureucratic
tasks that nurses (as well as physicians or researchers) have to carry out in
addition to their main activity or the teaching of basic measurable skills for
a teacher.
The heterogeneous relation that the two tasks have with the agent's motiva-
tion makes an interaction between them possible. This is the main dierence
with respect to the Holmstrom and Milgrom's result. In their model the ef-
fort for the two tasks can interact in the agent's cost function in dierent
ways: the activities can be complement or substitute in term of cost of eort
. The introduction of intrinsic motivation in the multitasking framework im-
plies that only the substituitability case remains relevant. In fact, given the
agent's timing constraint, the task 2 subtracts time to task 1, from which
intrinsic benet derives. So, the reduction in the benet that the worker
can get from the job (through the performance of tasks 1) increases the
marginal cost of eort for the main activity. In order to capture and ana-
lyze in a formal way this feature, that is the interdependence of tasks, we
assume that the eort relative to the two activities, a1 and a2, interact in
the cost function of the agent. Consequently the Hessian matrix is no more
diagonal.
The second consequences derived from the introduction of intrinsic motiva-
tion is the dierent degree of tasks observability. Since 1 is the task related
to intrinsic motivation a1 is not observable while a2 is .
Given the relation between tasks and intrinsic motivation previously de-
scribed, I dene the agent's cost function in the following way
C(a1; a2; ) =
1
1 + 
a21 + a
2
2 + a1a2 (3.3)
The agent's cost of eort depends non linearly on the quantity of eort
exerted in the two tasks and on the parameter [0; 1], capturing the degree
of intrinsic motivation for the job. If  = 1 the agent has the highest degree
of motivation; if  = 0 we come back to the standard case of non motivated-
agent. This variable is taken as exogenous because the intrinsic motivation
for a given job is an ex-ante characteristic of the worker.  can also be
considered as a measures of the magnitude of the interaction between the
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two tasks. Indeed, the reason for which a1 and a2 interact is the presence
of intrinsic motivation. Moreover,  represents the value of second cross
partial derivative of the cost function, C
00
ij . In particular, given the interval
to which  belongs, we have C
00
ij > 0, whenever the agent is intrinsically
motivated (i.e.  6= 0). This implies that the two tasks are substitute in the
cost function7. Indeed, as previously explained, now the intrinsic motivation
becomes a well dened source of substituitability.
It is straightforward to note that a1 and a2 have dierent weights: one unit
of eort for the motivational task costs less than one unit of bureucratic
eort. Higher the values of  bigger this dierence. This occurs since, if
the agent is strongly intrinsically motivated, the cost for a1 is lower with
respect to the case in which she is weakly motivated, while the cost of a2
does not change in the two situations. Moreover, the interaction between
tasks becomes more important when the value of  increases, and so the
possible negative eects due to that interaction becomes more important
and might be really crucial.
The next step is the denition of the optimal incentive scheme. The
principal's problem is
max2a1 + a2   (
1
1 + 
a21 + a
2
2 + a1a2) 
r
2

0
 (3.4)
s:t: argmaxa1;a21a1 + 2a2 +    (
1
1 + 
a21 + a
2
2 + a1a2)
First of all it is interesting to focus on some elements emerging from
the incentive compatibility constraint. As already seen, it becomes i =
C
0
i(a1; a2). By dierentiating and inverting the latter relation I get the elas-
ticity of task ai with respect to i. The direct eect, i.e.
@ai
@i
, is positive,
meaning that the incentive specically drawn for a given task has a positive
eect on the amount of eort exerted for such activity. Instead, an inter-
esting aspect emerges looking at the indirect eect @ai
@J
. If we consider the
specic case
@a1
@2
=  
(1 + )
4  2(1 + )
< 0
we can immediately note that a negative relation between the main task
7The parameter  could be also interpreted as the degree of cost substituability
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and the incentive related to the secondary activity emerges. The higher the
incentive for task 2, lower the amount of eort provided for task 1. This
eect is called crowding out eect (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) and de-
rives from the cost function, when the substitutability of the two inputs
emerges. Indeed, the negative sign of the derivative of a1 with respect to
2 is due to the sign of the numerator (positive), representing the second
cross partial derivative of the cost function. Since in this case the source of
the substituibility is the presence of intrinsic motivation, I speak of moral
crowding out eect. Notice that bigger is , greater is the eect in absolute
value. This implies that the stronger the agent's intrinsic motivation, the
more important the moral crowding out eect, because a big value of 2
induces a greater reduction in the eort exerted for the rst task.
In this context the moral crowding out eect introduced by Frey emerges
from a simple multitasking framework, in which the agent's cost function is
modied with respect to the standard framework to take into account the
role of intrinsic motivation. Moreover, an important aspect is that here the
crowding out of intrinsic motivation is not a direct eect (as proposed by
Frey), where the extrinsic reward for a given task impacts on eort exerted
for such task. Here it acts indirectly: indeed, it is the monetary incentive
for the secondary activity that crowds out the eort for the main task. So,
in this particular framework, an indirect moral crowding out eect emerges,
that acts through the tasks allocation induced using monetary incentives.
Now I proceed by computing the solution of the principal's problem. As
already pointed out, it is generally dicult to measure the eort exerted for
the task related to intrinsic motivation; therefore, I solve the problem assum-
ing that the rst task is not observable while the second one is. Moreover
the error terms are independent. Then the optimal solution must satisfy
1 = 0 (3.5)
2 =
1  (1+)2
1 + rﬀ22(2 
2(1+)
2 )
(3.6)
Looking carefully at equation (6) is important because, given that a1
is not observable at all, the only way to provide incentives for a1 passes
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through the value of 2.
Even in this case the crucial term is C
00
ij , whose positive sign determines
the way in which the optimal value of 2 has to be set. The term
(1+)
2
is the explicit value of
C
00
12
C
00
11
, thus it is obvious that the complementarity or
substituibility between the two tasks is crucial for the nal result (as shown
by Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). When, as in this context, the tasks can
only be substitutes in the cost function, the desirability of providing incen-
tive for the bureaucratic task is reduced because it decreases the amount of
eort for nursing. The reason is that increasing 2 raises the opportunity
cost of a1. Noteworthy, the solution of the principal's problem reects the
indirect moral crowding out eect. In fact, the optimal value of 2 is strictly
correlated to the degree of intrinsic motivation: bigger the value of , lower
the optimal value of 2. This implies that, when the motivational incentives
are very strong, the principal should induce the agent to spend few time do-
ing bureaucratic activity. In the limit case in which  = 1, the optimal value
of 2 should be zero. This result can be interpreted in the following way. If
the link between the agent's intrinsic motivation and her motivational task
is very strong, the use of explicit incentive to induce eort in one task that
is not correlated with motivation and that, moreover, takes time away from
the main task, can imply a big loss in term of agent's eort. In this case
the indirect moral crowding out would be very strong and, consequently, an
important incentive (the intrinsic benet) would be weakened. So, if she
was induced to spend even few time on bureaucratic activity, she would lose
a big part of her intrinsic benet and would put to work herself less in the
job.
The opposite situation is the one in which the agent is not intrinsically mo-
tivated at all, so  = 0. In this case we come back to the case of a standard
agent, for which the optimal incentive contract depends only on the risk
aversion and the task observability. So we will set 2 =
1
2rﬀ2
2
.
3.4 Discussion and empirical analysis
According to the prediction of the theoretical model, the best a principal
can do when he denes a wage scheme for an agent whose degree of intrin-
sic motivation is quite high (as it generally happens in the case of nurses,
physicians, teachers) is to set a xed wage, ! = . This results from the si-
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multaneous presence of the indirect moral crowding out eect - which makes
it suboptimal to provide incentive for the task not correlated with intrinsic
motivation, therefore 2 = 0 - and to the measurability problem - which
makes it impossible to dene incentives based on the non observable task,
i.e. 1 = 0 -. Another important point that emerges from the theoretical
analysis is the relevance of the tasks allocation related to the occurrence of
the moral crowding out eect.
The issue that comes into question is in which way the principal can still
provide incentives for the agent, even if he has to pay a xed wage. The
idea that emerges as a corollary of the theoretical results is that the tasks
allocation might be a useful incentive mechanism8. Carrying out tasks pos-
itively correlated with the intrinsic motivation for the job generates higher
satisfaction and, consequently, higher level of eort. On the contrary, if the
motivated agent is assigned to tasks not correlated with it, satisfaction may
decrease as well as provided eort. Therefore, allocating tasks in order to
assign the right weight to the agent's exstrinsic and intrinsic motivations be-
comes strategic in the light of incentive provision. With respect to this point
the observability of the agent's intrinsic motivation is a crucial element. In
order to assign tasks in the optimal way, the principal should know the value
of  and I assume that this occurs. Moreover, two considerations make this
assumption reasonable: i) in jobs for which motivation matters the work-
ers, even if heterogeneous, are on average motivated. Therefore the initial
allocation of tasks could be thought avoiding to assign to them a lot of non
motivational tasks9. ii) The principal is able to infer, even if in an imper-
8Also Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) use the multitasking framework to analyze job
design, looking at the impact of the crowding out eect in some principal-agent relation-
ships. In particular they look at: i) how tasks should be divided among dierent agents;
ii) how to allocate tasks if, respectively, the principal or the agent own the assets; iii)
the necessity of limiting the outside activities of the agents when the main task is hardly
measurable. My analysis is coherent with their one and is a way to introduce intrinsic
motivation in job design
9The two tasks are both necessary to produce outcome. If it is useful, in order to
provide incentive, to assign a small or null amount of task 2 to workers that are, on average,
motivated but whose exact motivation is not known by the principal, it is important to
understand to whom this task has to be assigned. Holmstrom and Milgrom suggest that,
in some cases, one should better assign tasks to dierent agents. The situation with
motivated agents, implying substituitability of the tasks in the cost function, is probably
one of these cases. The issue that immediately emerges is the budget constraint that the
principal has to bear. Indeed, more than one agent, generates higher costs. But the higher
costs should be compared with the improvement in terms of eort provided by the agent
and it is not obvious which is the result with respect to principal's prot.
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fect way, the workers' motivation through the observation of the agents'
behaviour over time. Once the value  of the intrinsic motivation is known,
the principal can modify the task allocation so that he assigns more task 1
and less task 2 to the agents with higher  and less task 1 and more task 2
to the worker with low .
In the following I want to verify the validity of the previous statement looking
at some empirical evidences relative to nurses'activities. Before presenting
my own analysis I relate the results of some studies developed in nursing
literature that support the usefulness of tasks allocation as incentive device.
Some empirical studies (Sochalsky et al. 1997, Clark et al. 2001, Burke
2003 ) conducted in the USA, Canada and Western Europe analyze the
impact that the healthcare reforms implemented in the 90's have had on
the way in which healthcare professional deliver services, looking in partic-
ular at the nurses' case. A common evidence is the hospital restructuring
induced by dierent reforms. In the new organization the hospital systems
are characterized, at international level, by a very similar restructuring inter-
ventions, aimed at the reduction of labour expenses through work redesign.
From data it emerges that nurses have been a prime target for work redesign
and this has generated a change in their numbers and skill mix and a fun-
damental reorganization of clinical care at the inpatient unit level.
Clark et al. (2001) report the results of a survey related to the workplace
experience of hospital based nurses. They analyze the impact of hospital
reforms that have lead to a job restructure through reduction in sta levels,
increasing in workload, change in the typology of tasks they have to carry
out and expansion of responsibilities. Consequently, nurses'job was changed
directly and indirectly in dierent ways. Their number was reduced and
so the workload for the remaining nurses increased. The downsizing of the
nurse work force was accompanied by an expanded use of unlicensed assist-
ing personnel: so the nurses were asked to solve supervision activity, very
far from their primary task. It is obvious that this kind of changes modify a
lot their work, from direct patient care at the bedside to indirect supervision
of care. It is shown that the loss of direct contact with patients reduces the
quality of care and the satisfaction they receive from their work. Moreover,
the substantial increase in the amount of paper-work they were required
to complete after the job reorganization created a lot of discontent among
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nurses. The time spent doing this work further reduced the direct nurse
contact with patients. In addition to the higher level of stress and the lower
job satisfaction felt by nurses, the empirical analysis shows that also the
total amount of eort exerted by nurses (measured in term of absenteeism)
decreased after the job reorganization.
Burke (2002) analyzes more explicitly the impact of hospital reorganiza-
tion in Ontario on nursing sta satisfaction and well-being. He nds that,
as a consequences of the job reorganization (with the same characteristics
pointed by Clark et al.) nursing sta reports less job satisfaction, more ab-
senteeism and less psychological well-being than nurses employed in other
workplace.
What emerges from the previous case studies is the negative relation between
a job organization that induces nurses to spend less time doing activities re-
lated to their intrinsic motivation (direct patients care), and the level of
satisfaction and eort exerted by nursing sta. The indirect moral crowd-
ing out eect could be a reasonable way to explain this evidence. The fact
that nurses have to spend a lot of time doing supervision and bureaucratic
activities, that clearly are not tasks for which intrinsic motivation matters,
reduces the intrinsic benet and, consequently, the exerted eort.
3.4.1 Data and methodology
An empirical analysis of the role of task allocation in the denition of work-
ers' incentive scheme is carried out using data coming from the national
sample survey of US registered nurses. This survey is conducted, since 1980,
every four years; I use the sample relative to 2004. The purpose of the survey
is to provide an integrated, in-depth picture of the total registered nurses
population through the gathering of data about: nurses' demographic and
economic situation, education, advanced training and graduate degrees by
speciality, principal employment status, secondary employment in nursing,
employment outside of paid nursing and plans for employment in nursing.
The target population is all registered nurses with active licences in 50 states
and the sample is composed of 35724 nurses representing a probability sam-
ple of registered nurses selected from the target population. Among them I
eliminated all those people for which information about tasks allocation is
not available. The sample I use is composed of 29452 observations.
The nurses I consider are mainly women (94% of the sample), whose edu-
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cational level is mostly characterized by the attainment of an associate or
a bachelor's degree and no other degrees after the initial registered nurses
education (28% gets an additional academic degree and only 10% complete
the formal education for advanced practice nurse preparation). Hospital and
ambulatory are the principal health care settings for the 68% of the sample
and for the 60% clinical nurse specialist is the position title that is most-
closely related to their nursing position.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the overall sample in 2004 and
for the subsample on which I perform my econometric analysis. As it can
be seen, there are no marked dierences between the two, as far as the ob-
servable characteristics are concerned.
Before introducing the regressions I run I present some descriptive statistics
relative to the main variables used in the empirical analysis.
All the nurses that are employed or self-employed in nursing are asked to
estimate the percentage of their time spent in dierent activities during a
usual workweek. The activities are: administration, consultation with agen-
cies and professionals, direct patient care, research, supervision and man-
agement, teaching nursing or other health profession students and, nally,
a general other activities. As the picture 1 shows the largest part of nurses
carries out mainly the direct patient care task (mean: 60%; median: 75%)
and the other tasks represent lower than 20% of their total time.
The dataset provides a constructed variable (domfunct) that uses the
answers to the previous question to identify the function which occupies
more than 50% of the time in the principal nursing position during a usual
workweek. To develop the analysis I aggregate the functions that are ho-
mogeneous and built dummy variables taking value one if the nurse's main
activities are the considered ones. I dene dominant function administrative
(domfnct administrative) the sum of administrative and consultant activities
(5; 58% of the sample); dominant function direct patient care (domfnct car-
ing, 60; 46% of the sample); dominant function teaching (domfnct teaching)
as the sum of teaching, researching and supervision (8; 52% of the sample).
The previous ones are the independent variables of the regressions.
Another question of the survey that is very important for my analysis asks
'How would you best describe your feelings about your principal nursing po-
sition?'. The largest part of the nurses in the sample (78; 36%) declares to
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Figure 3.1: Principal nursing position: % in dierent tasks
be satised with their job, a small group is neither satised nor dissatised
(7; 83%) and the remaining part (13; 75%) is dissatised. I dene satisfaction
the dummy variables that takes value one if nurse declares to be satised.
From a simple analysis of the covariances matrix between the job satisfaction
and all the typologies of dominant function it emerges a positive correlation
only between satisfaction and domfnct caring, while the correlation is neg-
ative when the nurse's dominant function is not strictly related to caring.
As usual in literature, the proxy for eort that I use is the amount of over-
time (numbers of hours that are voluntarily chosen and that are paid as
overtime) provided by nurses in their principal nursing position. On aver-
age, the overtime hours are 1; 6 per week. The most part of nurses who
declare to have provided overtime hours in their last workweek (23% of the
sample) relate between 1 and 12 hours. I build a dummy variable called
overtime equal to one if the amount of overtime is greater than zero. More-
over, I also use the dummy variable high overtime, that is equal to one when
the nurse works more than 5 hours of overtime (6; 13% of the sample).
Again, a rst look at the covariances between overtime and the other main
variables of the analysis is interesting. The correlation between a positive
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amount of overtime and the nurse's dominant functions is positive if the
nurse spends the most part of her worktime in caring activity and negative
for all the other dominant functions. The same relationships stay valid also
considering the correlation with high overtime. Noteworthy, also the corre-
lation between overtime and satisfaction is positive.
I aim at verifying if the tasks allocation can be an alternative (with re-
spect to monetary rewards) and valide incentive mechanism when the job
is one for which motivation matters (nursing, in this case) and, therefore,
the payment method is a xed wage. In order to understand if the way in
which activities are allocated10 is relevant I develop two dierent analyses.
First, I verify if a correlation between the time spent in dierent tasks and
job satisfaction exists and, if yes, in which direction it acts. The goal is to
understand if the allocation of working time among activities that are dif-
ferentely correlated with motivation is associated with the the satisfaction
workers get from their job.
Then, the same analysis is carried out considering tasks allocation and the
amount of overtime work hours, used as a measure of eort. I want to
investigate if the way in which the principal assigns dierent tasks to an
intrinsically motivated agent impacts on the eort decision. If eort were
positively correlated with motivational task (direct patient care) and nega-
tively correlated with non motivational tasks (administration, supervision,
consultancy,teaching) I could claim that an allocation of tasks coherent with
the agent's intrinsic motivation for the job is a useful incentive mechanism.
I run the following regressions in order to look at the correlation between
the tasks the agent has to carry out and her satisfaction and eort:
satisfactioni =+ domfnctcaringi + domfnctadministrativei+
+ domfnctteachingi + xi + i
(3.7)
10Given the working contract of nurses I consider that, in the sample, the task allocation
is mainly dened by the principal.
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overtime i = + ﬃdomfnctcaringi + 'domfnctadministrativei+
+ domfnctteachingi + yi + i
(3.8)
where xi and yi are the vector of controls and i the individuals. I es-
timate the two equations using the probit model and the linear regression
model. The estimated coecients reveal the expected impact that the main
activities the agent carries out have on job satisfaction and hours of over-
time. According to the theoretical prediction I expect a positive coecient
for the domfnct caring and negative for all the other explanatory variables
associated with tasks allocation.
3.4.2 Results
Table 2 shows the results of the probit and OLS estimation of equation (6),
without controls. In column (1) and (3) the coecients of domfnct caring
and domfnct administrative are statistically signicant with the expected
signs, while the opposite is true for the other covariate. This suggests that
taking care of patients as main activity has a positive impact on the proba-
bility that the nurse declares satisfaction with her job. The opposite is true
if the main task is administrative and being mainly engaged in teaching is
not correlated with satisfaction.
Columns (2) and (4) present the results of the estimation of equation (6)
with the introduction when of some controls. I add control variables (gen-
der, age, annual income, level of education, hours worked) that could be
correlated with the nurses' satisfaction in order to verify if the activities
they do are really relevant. First, only the variable domfnct caring remains
statistically dierent from zero and with the expected positive sign. Being
young (< 40 years) and being female each has a positive impact on the
probability of job satisfaction. Noteworthy, among the other controls that
are signicantly correlated with the probability of being satised, obtaining
additional degrees after graduating from nursing and having the status of
advanced practice nurses have negative signs.
The previous empirical evidence strongly suggests that the activities related
to caring are positively correlated with job satisfaction. On the other hand,
spending most of the working time on tasks for which motivation does not
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matter (i.e. domfnct administrative and teaching) is negatively correlated
with the probability of job satisfaction. Moreover, it is interesting to note
that only the task-related variables (except the demographic ones) have an
impact on job satisfaction.
Table 3 shows the probit and OLS estimations of equation (7), with over-
time as dependent variable. Columns (1) and (3) clearly show that: i) all
the typologies of dominant function are signicant determinant of overtime
work; ii) domfnct caring is the only one positively correlated with the prob-
ability of providing hours of overtime; the coecient of the other dominant
functions have negative signs. The same results still hold when controls are
added to the regression (columns (2) and (4)). In particular, the coecients
keep the same sign after controlling for hours worked in the last workweek,
net of the voluntary overtime (hours worked), the worked weeks in a year
and the place of job (that is for the fact that the nurse works in hospital
or ambulatory). All the previous controls are correlated with the probabil-
ity to provide overtime in the predictable way. Among the other controls
that are statistically dierent from zero, having children younger than 6 and
being married each has the predictable negative signs, while having adult
dependents at home has the predicted positive sign.
Running the same equation using the dummy high overtime as dependent
variable yields the same results discussed above (or exactly the opposite
signs with low overtime).
What clearly emerges from this empirical analysis is again the relevance of
the tasks the nurse carries out. The main activity of a nurse is correlated
with the eort she provides. In particular, doing caring activities is posi-
tively correlated with the probability of providing overtime work. On the
contrary, all the other dominant functions are negatively correlated with
eort.
3.4.3 Robustness checks
In order to verify the existence of the correlation between the tasks carried
out by nurses, job satisfaction and overtime as a measure of eort, I look
at the prevalent function of each nurse. As an additional proof I run the
equation (6) and (7) using dierent independent variables related to tasks
allocation. Using directly the declared percentage of time spent in dierent
tasks during the usual workweek I build dierent measure of tasks alloca-
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tion.
First, I keep the previous level of aggregation but use the mean instead of the
median (that is used to build the dominant function variables) as threshold
value. Therefore, I use the followings as independent variables : i) moti-
vational task that is a dummy taking the value of one if the nurse spends
more than 60% (sample mean value of the variabile time in direct patient
care) of her time on direct caring activity and zero otherwise; ii) nonmot
administrative, a dummy that takes the value of one if the nurse spends
more than 27% (mean value) of her time carrying out administration and
consultancy and zero otherwise; iii) nonmot teaching, a dummy that takes
the value of one if the nurse spends more than 12% (mean value) of her time
carrying out researching, teaching and supervisioning and zero otherwise.
Columns (1) and (2) of table 4 show that the time of the caring task is signif-
icantly dierent from zero and positively correlated with job satisfaction as
before. In this case neither the administrative tasks nor the teaching tasks
are statistically correlated with satisfaction. Among the controls, the vari-
ables that are statistically dierent from zero are the same of the analysis
with that of the dominant functions.
Columns (1) and (2) of table 5 present the estimated coecients of the
overtime equation. Again, the motivational task is positive and statistically
dierent from zero and the two variables representing non motivational tasks
are not dierent from zero.
Finally I run again the two regressions again using the percentage of time
devoted to each task directly as regressors. Columns (3) and (4) of table 4
and 5 show that, for both satisfaction and overtime the positive correlation
with the task for which motivation matters still exists, even after introducing
more controls. Administrative task, consultation and research remain nega-
tively correlated with overtime, while supervision activity is now positively
correlated with both satisfaction and overtime. Time spent in teaching is
no more relevant for both the dependent variable.
Changing the aggregation level also yields the same result: a positive rela-
tionship between direct patient care, job satisfaction and eort still emerges.
Also some evidence of the negative relationship with the other tasks is found
11.
11The dierent results with respect to the case in which the non caring tasks represent
the agent's dominant function may be due to the fact that, on average, the percentage
of time spent in these activities is quite low. So if they are not the prevailing activities,
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Finally, I can conclude that the results of the empirical analysis support
the corollary of the model. Indeed, the analysis developed using data rela-
tive to a job - nursing - for which intrinsic motivation matters shows that
the time the agent spends carrying out tasks directly related to her motiva-
tion is positively correlated with job satisfaction and, more importantant for
incentives, with eort. On the contrary, the relationships between the two
previous variables and all the time spent on activities not directly related
to motivation are negative. So, the evidence of this relationships between
tasks, satisfaction and eort supports the idea that a possible way to provide
incentives to intrinsically motivated workers is the task allocation. Notewor-
thy, in this particular situation the job organization is even more relevant
since the eort exerted in tasks related to motivation is dicult to observe
and, so, extrinsic rewards based on eort cease to be an useful instrument.
3.5 Conclusion
The issue of providing incentives to agents is, generally, not trivial. The
design of an appropriate incentive scheme becomes even more complicated
when agents are intrinsically motivated for their job and, moreover, have to
carry out several tasks which dier in the degree they motivate them and in
their degrees of observability and measurability.
In the paper, I enrich the multitasking framework proposed by Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1991) with the agent's intrinsic motivation, underlying the
fact that the diculty to measure the eort exerted for a given task is often
correlated with the fact that the task reects the agent's intrinsic motiva-
tion for the job. The theoretical analysis shows the occurence of the indirect
moral crowding out eect, according to which the provision of extrinsic in-
centives for the non motivational task reduces the amount of eort for the
task linked to intrinsic motivation. It is the task allocation that crowds out
the benet induced by the intrinsic motivation and not the monetary reward
for the motivational task, contrary to the model of Frey (1999) . Given this
eect, the optimal incentive scheme is such that, with high level of intrinsic
motivation, the best thing the principal can do is to set a xed wage.
their eects are reasonably lower. But it is noteworthy that the correlation, when exists,
remain mainly negative.
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The empirical analysis aims at validating the implication of the model, ac-
cording to which an allocation of tasks that reects the link between activ-
ities and agent's intrinsic motivation can be a valide incentive instrument if
the wage cannot be used as an incentive. This idea is supported by the pos-
itive correlation between motivational tasks, job satisfaction and overtime,
and the negative one between non motivational tasks, job satisfaction and
overtime in the case of nursing.
The theoretical and empirical analyses carried out in this paper point out
the existence of a variety of incentive instruments that is wider than the sim-
ple pay for performance scheme, especially when job motivations dierent
to the extrinsic incentives are taken into account.
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3.7 Appendix
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
All Sample Subsample
female .94 .94
(.001) (.001)
age 46 45
(.060) (.061)
additional degree .27 .27
(.002) (.002)
apn status .10 .11
(.001) (.001)
professional degree .34 .35
(.002) (.002)
hospital and ambulator .68 .68
(.002) (.002)
total hours worked 39 39
(.089) (.088)
annual income 52189 52235
(149.285) (149.736)
overtime .35 .23
(.002) (.002)
satisfaction .42 .49
(.002) (.002)
No. of Obs. 35724 29586
Notes: Standard error in parentheses. Source: Author's elaborations on National Sample Survey
of Registered Nurses, 2004.
Chapter 3 71
Table 3.2: Eect of task allocation on satisfaction - dep.var. dummy = 1 if
the nurse is satised
Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
domfnct caring 0.075 0.056 0.030 0.022
(0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)***
domfnct administrative -0.075 -0.053 -0.030 -0.021
(0.034)** (0.034) (0.014)** (0.014)
domfct teaching 0.032 0.046 0.013 0.018
(0.029) (0.029) (0.012) (0.012)
young 0.141 0.056
(0.017)*** (0.007)***
female 0.061 0.024
(0.030)** (0.012)**
annual income -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
additional degree -0.035 -0.014
(0.018)* (0.007)*
apn status -0.124 -0.049
(0.027)*** (0.010)***
professional degree -0.001 -0.001
(0.015) (0.006)
total hours 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
constant -0.040 -0.105 0.484 0.458
(0.014)*** (0.041)** (0.006)*** (0.016)***
No. of Obs. 29586.000 29518.000 29586.000 29518.000
Log likelihood -20489.766 -20374.427 -21455.577 -21337.980
F test 11.754 17.311
Notes: Robust standard error in parentheses. Source: Author's elaborations on National Sample
Survey of Registered Nurses, 2004.
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Table 3.3: Eect of task allocation on overtime - dep.var. dummy = 1 if the
nurse provide voluntary overtime
Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
domfnct caring 0.275 0.252 0.083 0.073
(0.020)*** (0.021)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)***
domfnct admninistrative -0.606 -0.690 -0.119 -0.135
(0.050)*** (0.055)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***
domfnct teaching -0.106 -0.106 -0.027 -0.027
(0.034)*** (0.036)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)***
hours worked -0.010 -0.003
(0.001)*** (0.000)***
annual weeks worked 0.013 0.003
(0.001)*** (0.000)***
hospamb 0.296 0.075
(0.021)*** (0.005)***
female -0.287 -0.097
(0.033)*** (0.011)***
young 0.214 0.064
(0.021)*** (0.007)***
children under 6 -0.162 -0.051
(0.027)*** (0.008)***
annual income 0.000 0.000
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
adult dependents 0.160 0.047
(0.023)*** (0.007)***
high household income 0.021 0.007
(0.026) (0.007)
married -0.098 -0.030
(0.020)*** (0.006)***
constant -0.891 -1.291 0.187 0.140
(0.017)*** (0.073)*** (0.004)*** (0.017)***
No. of Obs. 29586.000 28394.000 29586.000 28394.000
Log likelihooos -15551.884 -14332.907 -15979.362 -14721.729
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.057
R2 0.020 0.056
F test 309.723 155.985
Notes: Robust standard error in parentheses. Source: Author's elaborations on National Sample
Survey of Registered Nurses, 2004.
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Table 3.4: Eect of task allocation on satisfaction - dep.var. dummy = 1 if
the nurse is satised
Probit OLS Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
motivational task 0.047 0.019
(0.026)* (0.010)*
nonmot administrative 0.000 0.000
(0.024) (0.009)
nonmot teaching -0.025 -0.010
(0.021) (0.008)
young 0.141 0.056 0.141 0.056
(0.017)*** (0.007)*** (0.017)*** (0.007)***
female 0.061 0.024 0.061 0.024
(0.030)** (0.012)** (0.030)** (0.012)**
annual income -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
additional degree -0.034 -0.013 -0.028 -0.011
(0.018)* (0.007)* (0.019) (0.007)
apn status -0.122 -0.049 -0.116 -0.046
(0.027)*** (0.011)*** (0.027)*** (0.011)***
professional degree -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.015) (0.006) (0.015) (0.006)
total hours 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
administration -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
consultation -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
patient care 0.001 0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
research 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
supervision 0.002 0.001
(0.001)*** (0.000)***
teaching 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
constant -0.090 0.464 -0.163 0.435
(0.047)* (0.018)*** (0.054)*** (0.022)***
No. of Obs. 29518.000 29518.000 29518.000 29518.000
Log likelihood -20375.695 -21339.254 -20365.934 -21329.471
F test 17.067 14.650
Notes: Robust standard error in parentheses. Source: Author's elaborations on National Sample
Survey of Registered Nurses, 2004.
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Table 3.5: Eect of task allocation on overtime - dep.var. dummy = 1 if the
nurse provide voluntary overtime
Probit OLS Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
motivational task 0.322 0.090
(0.031)*** (0.008)***
nonmot administrative 0.007 0.000
(0.028) (0.008)
nonmot teaching -0.033 -0.006
(0.025) (0.007)
hours worked -0.011 -0.003 -0.010 -0.003
(0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)***
annual weeks worked 0.013 0.003 0.013 0.003
(0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)***
hospamb 0.310 0.079 0.233 0.059
(0.021)*** (0.005)*** (0.022)*** (0.005)***
female -0.289 -0.098 -0.283 -0.094
(0.033)*** (0.011)*** (0.033)*** (0.011)***
young 0.223 0.067 0.204 0.061
(0.021)*** (0.007)*** (0.021)*** (0.007)***
children under 6 -0.162 -0.050 -0.172 -0.053
(0.027)*** (0.008)*** (0.027)*** (0.008)***
annual income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
adult dependents 0.166 0.049 0.161 0.046
(0.023)*** (0.007)*** (0.023)*** (0.007)***
high household income 0.022 0.006 0.027 0.009
(0.026) (0.007) (0.026) (0.007)
married -0.101 -0.030 -0.093 -0.028
(0.020)*** (0.006)*** (0.021)*** (0.006)***
administration -0.008 -0.002
(0.001)*** (0.000)***
consultation -0.002 -0.001
(0.001)** (0.000)***
patient care 0.005 0.001
(0.001)*** (0.000)***
research -0.003 -0.001
(0.001)*** (0.000)***
supervision 0.005 0.001
(0.001)*** (0.000)***
teaching -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
constant -1.328 0.129 -1.470 0.097
(0.076)*** (0.018)*** (0.086)*** (0.019)***
N 28394.000 28394.000 28394.000 28394.000
log likelihood -14444.005 -14805.166 -14152.525 -14559.444
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.067
R2 0.049 0.068
F test 124.555 146.253
Notes: Robust standard error in parentheses. Source: Author's elaborations on National Sample
Survey of Registered Nurses, 2004.
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Conclusion
The research developed with this doctoral thesis concerns heterogeneous
labor issues. The aim of each analysis was the understanding of the mecha-
nisms acting in a given situation and the identication of the possible policy
implications.
The recent literature on wage inequality and income distribution show
that the computerization process has polarized the labor markets of ad-
vanced economies: employment has shifted toward very high-wage and low-
wage jobs, and wages have grown faster at the extremes of the earning dis-
tribution. While this evidence is clearly present in the US labor market, in
many European countries (among them Italy, France and Spain), there has
not been any signicant change in the share of low-paid employment. Start-
ing from the fact that one of the main dierence between the US and the
European labor market is the institutional enviroment, we proposes a theo-
retical model to study the eects of computerization in a unionized economy
in order to explain cross-country dierences in job polarization trends. In
the model, the union can choose to adopt dierent policies depending on its
employment target. It predicts that technological change induces (i) a reduc-
tion of wages and employment in routine labor tasks, typically replaced by
computer capital; (ii) an increase in wages and employment in abstract labor
tasks that are complements to computers; (iii) some heterogeneous results in
the manual labor market, depending on the union employment target. We
expect a positive eect on manual wages and no change in manual employ-
ment when the union protects only its current members (insiders); we have
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an uncertain eect on manual wages and a positive one on manual employ-
ment when unions care about the entire manual labor supply. Therefore, as
a result, labor market institutions regulate the trade-o between low-skilled
wage growth and low-skilled employment growth.
The comparison between the theoretical predictions and the Italian labor
market pattern provides empirical support to the analysis. Indeed, a coun-
try as Italy - where the technological shock occurred and the union is an
inuential presence - has a labor market characterized by the same wages
and employment patterns predicted by the model.
This analysis is a step further in the comprehension of the role performed by
institutions and of the labor market eects that can emerge from the inter-
action between technological shocks and a specic institutional enviroment.
The investigation of the link between the female partecipation in the
labor market and the immigration issue is the goal of the second part of my
research, that uses Italian labor market as an interesting case study. A signif-
icant body of literature highlights that the labor supply decisions of women
are strictly related to the market for time-intensive services, which directly
substitute for household production. For this reason we look at these specif
sectors to reach our goal. Examining the pattern of wages and employment
in these sectors we nd that both of them have increased substantially over
time, probably because of an increase in service demand greater than sup-
ply. As a result, Italian families have had to pay for the growing cost of
externalizing home production, which has probably reduced the incentive to
participate to the labor market. Therefore, the reduction of this cost may
induce a higher partecipation rate, especially among women; to get this re-
sult an increase of services supply would be desiderable. The policymakers
could theoretically use many measures to reach this result. Among the oth-
ers, we consider the immigration issue (surely the most inexpensive solution
in terms of public spending). Because immigrants are highly specialized in
time-intensive low-skilled services, we verify whether migration inows have
any impact on female decisions to supply labor. We nd that the higher the
share of immigrants in the province, the lower the probability that a woman
does not supply labor because of her family.
The interesting policy implication deriving from this analysis is the necessity
to be very careful in the implementation of restrictive immigration policies,
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usually sustained by the idea according to which immigrants displace Italian
workers, reducing wages and job opportunities in the labor market. Many
authors run down this idea, showing that this is not always the case, because
of the imperfect substituitability between natives and immigrants. Also our
research provides evidence against the naive use of restrictive policies. Ideed,
we nd that: i) the lack of immigrants makes the supply of some crucial ser-
vices grow less than the demand, inducing higher cost for natives; ii) higher
presence of immigrants impact positively on the female partecipation in the
labor market, because they provides services that reduce the time spent for
household production.
Finally, the last issue examined in the thesis is relative to the eect of
introducing intrinsic motivation in a multitasking framework. Some tasks
are positively related to the intrinsic motivation while others not and the
dierent activities the agent carries out are heterogeneous in terms of their
degree of observability. The simultaneous presence of these two elements
in the theoretical framework leads to the occurence of the indirect moral
crowding out eect, according to which the benet generated by the intrin-
sic motivation associated with the motivational task is crowded out by the
extrinsic incentives for the non motivational task. Given that the indirect
moral crowding out eect is the main mechanism acting in the model, the
prediction I get is that with highly motivated agents the principal sets a
xed wage and, so, he cannot use monetary rewards to provide incentives.
This result suggest that the principal should nd other ways to incentivate
motivated workers. The idea that emerges from the formal analysis is the
usefulness of the task allocation to reach such objective. If the principal
takes correctly into account the correlation between tasks and intrisic mo-
tivation can raise the eort exeterted by the agent, through the intrinsic
benet that she derives from the simple fact of working. An agent more
satised of her job will provide more eort. The empirical analysis, that
studies the correlation between the tasks allocation, job satisfaction and ef-
fort (measured using the hours of voluntary overtime) of the US registered
nurses, support this hypotesis. Indeed, I nd a positive correlation between
nurses' motivational tasks and job satisfaction, and between motivational
tasks and voluntary overtime work, while a negative correlation between
non motivational tasks and job satisfaction, and non motivational tasks and
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overtime work.
What the analysis entails is the necessity to dene the incentive scheme
looking carefully at the agent's characteristics. The extrinsic remuneration
is not the only possible and useful method, mainly when agents are led to
exert eort also by non pecuniary reason. The way in which dierent tasks
are allocated to the agent (or to dierent agents) can, in some situations,
reach better results in terms of eort and, also, cost reduction.
This work has contributed to the labor economics literature, through the
discussion of some issues that are central and debatable in the economic
analysis. Moreover, some of them are relevant also from a political point
of view and, therefore, the results obtained can enrich the political debate
relative to important economic issues.
